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Abstract
We propose a novel explanation for classic international macro puzzles regarding
capital flows and portfolio investment, which builds on modern macro-finance mod-
els of experience-based belief formation. Individual experiences of past macroeco-
nomic outcomes have been shown to exert a long-lasting influence on beliefs about
future realizations, and to explain domestic stock-market investment. We argue
that experience effects can explain the tendency of investors to hold an over pro-
portional fraction of their equity wealth in domestic stocks (home bias), to invest in
domestic equity markets in periods of domestic crises (retrenchment), and to with-
draw capital from foreign equity markets in periods of foreign crises (fickleness).
Experience-based learning generates additional implications regarding the strength
of these puzzles in times of higher or lower economic activity and depending on
the demographic composition of market participants. We test and confirm these
predictions in the data.
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1 Introduction
At least since Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000), researchers have aimed to find a unifying
explanation for the major puzzles in international macro-economics that is both realistic
and empirically convincing. Traditionally, explanations the home bias in stock-market
investments and other capital-market anomalies have largely relied on the dichotomy of
traded versus non-traded goods, on trade costs, and on other frictions. The more recent
literature has aimed to improve the realism of these models, which often seemed too rigid
or miscalibrated in terms of magnitude (Coeurdacier and Rey, 2013).
In this paper, we aim to improve a different aspect of modeling realism – the psychologi-
cal realism of investors’ belief formation. We show that the modern macro-finance models
of belief formation, and in particular the notion of experience-based learning, contribute
to a better understanding of international capital flows and portfolio investments.
What is experience-based learning? Motivated by the investor response to macro-
shocks such as the Great Depression or the 2008 Financial Crisis, modern models of
belief formation have focused on two elements. The first is the overweighting of recent
realizations. When predicting future returns in the stock, housing, or other asset markets,
investors appear to overly rely on their observations of those markets in recent months
or years.1 The second key element is the long-lasting effect of crisis experiences and the
associated systematic cross-sectional differences. As conveyed by the notion of “depres-
sion babies” or the “deep scars” of the 2008 financial crisis (Blanchard, 2012, Malmendier
and Shen, 2017), macro-economic shocks alter investment and consumption behavior for
decades to come. Moreover, younger cohorts tend to react significantly more strongly
than older cohorts. For example, investors who have lived through financial crises tend
to shy away from stock-market investment in the long-run and are pessimistic about
1This first element features in several of the more recent models, including natural expectation for-
mation (Fuster et al., 2011, 2010) and over-extrapolation (Barberis et al., 2015, 2016).
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future stock market returns, and this long-term influence is more pronounced among
younger generations (Malmendier and Nagel, 2011).2
Models of experience effects naturally generate both the overweighting of recent ex-
periences and the long-lasting effects of lifetime experiences. Experience-based learners
assign extra weight to realizations of macro-financial variables that they have personally
experienced when they form beliefs about future outcomes of the same variables. A given
crisis experience exerts stronger influence on younger cohorts, for whom the crisis expe-
rience constitutes a larger portion of their lifetime histories so far.3 In addition, models
of experience-based learning also rationalize classical asset-pricing puzzles such as return
predictability (Campbell and Shiller, 1988, Fama and French, 1988) and excess volatility
(LeRoy, 2005, LeRoy and Porter, 1981, Shiller, 1981), and micro-level stylized facts such
as investors chasing past performances.4
These insights have direct implications for international macro models, as investors in
different countries have different “experiences.” They differ in their exposures to domestic
versus foreign outcomes, and different countries also have different demographics. For
example, applied to the Asian financial crisis, experience-based learning would predict
that the crisis has exerted a significant influence on the risk attitudes and beliefs of East
Asians, and its influence was different for, say, Europeans – even controlling for income,
wealth, and other standard factors. Moreover, comparing regions across and within East
Asia, the influence is predicted to differ depending on where a higher fraction of young
market participants were exposed in each country. Nevertheless, most of the international
finance models to date are formulated under the rational expectation paradigm. By and
large, they work under the assumption that economic agents have correct beliefs about
2 The same holds for IPO experiences and future IPO investment (Chiang et al., 2011, Kaustia and
Knu¨pfer, 2008).
3See Malmendier et al. (2018) and Collin-Dufresne et al. (2016), and for the long-lasting effects the
model of Schraeder (2015).
4A discussion of the broader literature on learning and asset pricing puzzles, extrapolation, departures
from rational beliefs in asset pricing, and learning in OLG models is in Malmendier et al. (2018).
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the laws of complex economic processes.5
This paper introduces the notion of experience-based learning (EBL) into the interna-
tional macro context and shows its potential to jointly explain some of the long-standing
puzzles on capital flows and portfolio investment: home bias, fickleness, and retrench-
ment. Experience-based learning not only provides an alternative, psychologically and
micro founded explanation but also generates additional predictions that relate these puz-
zles to the demographic composition and size of risky-asset markets and the cyclicality
of capital flows.
The pattern of home bias in portfolio holdings was first discussed by Cooper and
Kaplanis (1986) and French and Poterba (1991), the latter of whom calculated that, at the
time, both Americans and Japanese investors held more than 90% of their equity wealth in
respective home countries’ stocks. The bias remains strong across countries today, though
it has declined relative to the late 1990s and is smaller in smaller countries (Cooper et al.,
2013). Retrenchment describes the pattern of domestic capital inflows increasing during
periods of domestic or global crisis (Broner et al., 2013, Forbes and Warnock, 2012),
and fickleness describes the pattern of foreign capital outflows increasing during periods
of domestic or global crises (Caballero and Simsek, 2018, Forbes and Warnock, 2012).
Our model jointly rationalizes these puzzles and generates new testable predictions that
account for the demographic composition of different countries and the interaction with
cycles of economic booms and busts.
Our model set-up extends the CARA-Normal OLG framework of Malmendier et al.
(2018) to a two-country setting. Agents maximize their end-of-life consumption, and
during their lifetime can invest in (i) the domestic and the foreign risky assets, i.e. a
claim to the stream of future outputs of the respective country, each in unit supply, and
(ii) a risk-free asset in fully elastic supply that pays return R. We assume that all agents
5Some exceptions include Gourinchas and Tornell (2004), Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2009),
Dziuda and Mondria (2012), Chousakos et al. (2016).
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know the distribution of outputs for both countries, including their variance, but that
they are uncertain and learn about the output means.
Experience-based learning means that agents overweight realizations observed during
their lifetimes when forecasting output. That is, even though all agents observe the entire
history of output realizations of both countries, they choose to weigh observations more
if they have personally experienced them. Furthermore, to capture that agents are more
confident about their knowledge of their own country than of a foreign country, we assume
that prior beliefs about domestic output are more precise than prior beliefs about the
foreign output. Note that, as all information is available to all agents, our model differs
from models of asymmetric information, and prices and portfolios do not contain relevant
information about future output realizations.
Turning to the equilibrium analysis, we first consider the benchmark case where coun-
tries are symmetric, i. e., all agents have the same prior beliefs and both countries have
the same demographics. In this benchmark scenario, both countries hold the same (ag-
gregate) portfolio and asset prices are constant over time.6 This is our version of the
mutual-fund theory (Markowitz, 1959), which states that all agents should hold the ef-
ficient (market) portfolio. This result is important in that it shows that EBL alone
does not generate heterogeneity in aggregate portfolio across countries. It does, however,
generate heterogeneity in portfolio holdings across cohorts within a country, as different
generations have different experiences (cf. Malmendier et al., 2018).
This prediction changes when we allow EBL agents to hold more precise prior beliefs
about their own country’s output, when countries differ in the demographics of their
market participants, or both. We begin by characterizing the equilibrium when prior
beliefs about domestic and foreign output differ, but both countries have the same de-
mographics. In that case, the equilibrium price of a country’s risky asset varies with
6We abstract away from the possibility of rational bubbles, which may introduce dynamics to asset
prices that are unrelated to fundamentals.
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past realizations of that country’s output.7 Specifically, it depends on the history of
past output realizations observed by the oldest market participant. As a result, demands
and resulting portfolio holdings also depend on such history, in line with the findings in
Malmendier et al. (2018).
This setting also generates home bias in portfolio holdings as agents perceive domestic
output as less risky. Moreover, agents over-react to foreign output realizations, generating
the observed pattern of retrenchment and fickleness of capital flows in response to shocks:
As agents are less confident about what they know about the foreign country, personal
experiences of foreign-output realizations strongly influence their respective posterior
beliefs. As a result, they over-react to negative shocks, e. g., low output realizations
abroad, which, together with general equilibrium effects, imply that capital inflows of
domestic agents (retrenchment) and outflows of foreign agents (fickleness) both increase –
even though all agents perceive the shock as negative. The reverse holds for booms, which
are followed by the corresponding decreases. The effect is observed in both countries
during global shocks. These predictions are consistent with, and provide an explanation
for, the evidence in Broner et al. (2013, 2006), Milesi-Ferretti and Tille (2011), who find
that domestic inflows and foreign outflows are counter-cyclical, and that retrenchments
and fickleness occur during both domestic and global crises. They are also consistent with
the negative correlation of (global and domestic) growth proxies with domestic inflows
(“retrenchment”) and foreign outflows (“stops”) documented in Forbes and Warnock
(2012).
Next we extend the model to consider the role of cross-country differences in the demo-
graphics of market participants. We analyze how the reaction of capital flows to a given
shock varies with the demographic composition of market participants in each country.
We find that when a country has a larger number of young market participants, it over-
7This result relies on the assumption that output realizations are independent across countries; else,
prices would depend on all output realizations. We discuss the role of output correlation in Section 2.3.
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reacts to both domestic and foreign shocks relative to the baseline model. As a result, the
retrenchment and fickleness effects are alleviated in this country. Vice versa, retrench-
ment and fickleness are exacerbated in countries with a smaller number of young market
participants.
Finally, we take our model predictions to the data. We use data from the IMF, World
Bank, and the World Federation of Exchanges. First, we confirm positive US home
bias in every period of our sample from 1980 to 2017. We then turn to a panel of G20
countries with a sample period from 1971-2017 and provide evidence of fickleness (outflow
of foreign funds) and retrenchment (inflow of domestic funds) after recessions. Turning
to the novel predictions of our model, we use UN population data to test for differences
by demographics. We show that both capital-flow patterns, fickleness and retrenchment,
are exacerbated when the number of older people in a given country is particularly high.
Through the lenses of our model, the data also suggests that longer experiences (older
age) is empirically more predictive of precise priors about a country than being a domestic
(rather than foreign) investor, underscoring the importance of experience effects.
Overall our findings illustrate that modern approaches to belief formation, which ac-
knowledge the long-lasting effects of prior experiences in domestic and foreign markets,
help explain longstanding puzzles in international capital flows and generate further
testable predictions that hold up in the data.
Related Literature. The literature on experience effects builds on the seminal work by
Kahneman and Tversky on availability bias. Tversky and Kahneman (1974) show that,
when individuals form beliefs about future realizations of stochastic variables, they tend
to assign extra weight to information that is easily “available” to them. Such informa-
tion tends to be personally experienced outcomes, and in particular recent realizations.
Building on this insight, Weber et al. (1993) provide extensive evidence that “learning
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from experience” is significantly more powerful than “learning from description.”8
In the economics literature, a growing body of evidence documents experience effects
in economic decision-making. In addition to the theoretical and empirical work cited
above, several papers show that investors who have experienced high inflation tend to
overestimate future inflation and interest rates, and thus invest more in housing (as an
inflation hedge). For the same (perceived) hedging reason, they also tend to finance
their housing with fixed-rate mortgages (cf. Botsch and Malmendier, 2018, Malmendier
and Nagel, 2016, Malmendier and Steiny, 2018).9 In the realm of consumption decisions,
consumers who have experienced periods of economic downturn and high unemployment
rates are more careful in their spending (Malmendier and Shen, 2017).
Turning to the international macro puzzles our analysis aims to explain, a large liter-
ature rationalizes the equity home bias, first documented by French and Poterba (1991)
and Tesar and Werner (1995). Coeurdacier and Rey (2013) and Cooper et al. (2013)
survey and summarize the leading explanations, including hedging motives (e. g., Coeur-
dacier and Gourinchas, 2016, Coeurdacier et al., 2010, Fidora et al., 2007, Solnik, 1974),
explicit costs and barriers to entering foreign stock markets (e. g., Black, 1974, Errunza
and Losq, 1985, Stulz, 1981), information asymmetries, and alternative approaches.
The theory proposed in this paper lies in the intersection of behavioral and informa-
tional approaches. Several papers highlight the importance of informational asymmetries
between domestic and foreign investors for understanding international capital flows.10
Gehrig (1993) shows that, in a two-country, noisy rational expectations setting, home
bias is a natural response to domestic agents having private information about domestic
assets. Relatedly, Brennan and Cao (1997) and Brennan et al. (2005) model a dynamic
8 Cf. also Hertwig et al. (2004) and Simonsohn et al. (2008).
9 Malmendier et al. (2018) show that even FOMC members’ stated inflation beliefs are strongly
affected by their personal lifetime experiences.
10The literature relying on informational asymmetries documents the roles of distance, language, and
culture in generating home bias (Bae et al., 2008, Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001, Malloy, 2005), but also
points to home bias at the local level, e. g., towards local companies (Coval and Moskowitz, 2001).
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setting with private and public information, in which domestic investors over-react to
public signals about the foreign country relative to foreign agents, as foreign agents also
have private information. This over-reaction to news is similar to the one described in
our model, with the twist that we allow all information to be public. On a similar note,
Dziuda and Mondria (2012), Mondria and Wu (2010), Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp
(2009) argue that home bias can result from small informational advantages or financial
frictions combined with agents’ information processing constraints.11 Here, we postulate
that agents overweight observations that they experience even when they do not have
informational advantages.
Relatedly, we assume that priors about domestic assets are more precise than those
about foreign assets, but not due to private information. Information-based rationaliza-
tions, such as Guidolin (2005), generate predictions that differ from the ones in our model,
and from empirical observations. First, in such a model, agents learn from prices and
portfolio holdings, which is not the case in our environment. Thus, a theory of private
information needs to explain why foreign agents do not mimic the portfolio holdings of
domestic agents. Second, in such models, domestic investors should earn higher expected
returns than foreigners. The evidence on this prediction is mixed (Ardalan, 2019, Coeur-
dacier and Rey, 2013). In contrast, in our setting, a more precise prior does not imply
that domestic agents earn higher expected returns, as prior beliefs need not be centered
around the truth. Finally, in our model, domestic agents over-react to any information
about the foreign country, generating the documented cyclicality of capital flows. These
patterns cannot be easily generated with models of private information. For example,
retrenchment of capital may not occur if domestic agents have more negative private
information about their own country than foreign agents, which is a possibility during
11Asymmetric information in international finance models can also rationalize trading patterns such
as return chasing, volatility of capital flows, and positive correlations between inflows and outflows (e.g.
Albuquerque et al., 2009, Dvorˇa´k, 2003, Tille and van Wincoop, 2014).
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downturns. That is, the theory proposed in this paper is able to jointly rationalize home
bias and other documented patterns of capital flows, such as retrenchment and fickleness
during global recessions, while most equity home bias models fail to rationalize these
facts jointly.
Our results also relate to a large literature on global imbalances and their relation
to demographics and saving decisions (Bernanke, 2005, Caballero et al., 2008, Caballero
and Krishnamurthy, 2009, Coeurdacier et al., 2015). This paper contributes to this line
of research by providing a novel connection between the demographic composition of
market participants and the sensitivity of capital flows to shocks, i. e., the cyclicality of
gross capital flows.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model
setup, the notion of experience-based learning, and our equilibrium concept. Section
3 characterizes equilibrium demand and prices for the full-information benchmark and
the baseline model. Section 4 introduces heterogeneity in the demographic structures of
markets across countries. In Section 5, we test the predictions of the model, and Section
6 concludes. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 Model Setup
Consider two countries H and F , each populated with overlapping generations of a con-
tinuum of risk-averse agents. Time is infinite and indexed by t. At each point in time
t ∈ N0, a new generation is born in each country and lives for two periods.12 Hence, there
are three generations alive at any t: the young, the old, and the retired. The generation
born at t = n is called generation n, and each generation has a mass of 1
4
identical agents.
Preferences. All agents have CARA preferences with risk aversion γ, and they maximize
12We define a period as the time between time t and t+ 1.
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per-period utility.13 Generation n in country i ∈ {H,F} is born with an endowment
of W i,n consumption goods. Agents can transfer resources across time by investing in
financial markets, where trading takes place at the beginning of each period. At the
end of the last period of their lives, agents consume the wealth they have accumulated.
Hence, the young and the old generations both participate in financial markets, while the
retired simply consume. Figure 1 shows the timeline of this economy.
Financial Markets. All agents have access to a risk-free asset, which pays a gross
return given by R, and two risky assets in unit net supply, each being a claim to the
stream of future risky outputs of a country j ∈ {H,F}, {yj,t}. That is, the dividend
paid on country j’s risky asset corresponds to country j’s output. We assume outputs to
be independent across countries and time and identically distributed, yj,t ∼ N
(
θj, σ
2
j
)
at
time t for j ∈ {H,F}.
Our model describes the decisions of different generations of domestic and foreign
investors to invest in domestic and foreign assets. To keep notation tractable, we use
superindices for the investor’s country of origin i and her generation n, and subindices
for the asset’s country of origin (issuance) j and time t.
2.1 The Agents’ Problem
Agents from generation n in country i that participate in financial markets have the
following budget constraint at any time t ∈ {n, n+ 1}
W i,nt = xi,nH,t · pH,t + xi,nF,t · pF,t + ai,nt , (1)
13 This myopia assumption simplifies the maximization problem considerably and highlights the main
determinants of portfolio choice generated by experience-based learning. It is commonly used in finance
(see Vives (2010)).
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where W i,nt denotes the wealth of generation n of country i at time t, xi,nj,t and ai,nt are
the investments of generation n of country i in the risky asset of country j ∈ {H,F} and
in the risk-free asset, respectively, and pj,t is the price of one unit of the risky asset of
country j at time t. As a result, wealth next period is
W i,nt+1 = xi,nH,t · (pH,t+1 + yH,t+1) + xi,nF,t · (pF,t+1 + yF,t+1) + ai,nt R (2)
=
∑
j∈{H,F}
xi,nj,t (pj,t+1 + yj,t+1 − pj,tR) +W i,nt R. (3)
We denote the excess payoff received in t+ 1 from investing at time t in one unit of the
risky asset of country j, relative to the risk-free asset, as sj,t+1 ≡ pj,t+1 + yj,t+1− pj,tR. In
our framework with CARA preferences, this is analogous to the equity premium. Using
this notation, W i,nt+1 =
∑
j∈{H,F} x
j,n
i,t sj,t+1 +W i,nt R.
To model uncertainty about fundamentals, we assume that agents do not know the
mean of the output processes, θH and θF , but can use past realizations to learn about
them. For tractability, the variance of output is σ2 for both countries, and is known by
all agents at all times; see Section 2.2 below for more details.
Given a wealth level W i,nt , the problem of generation n at each time t ∈ {n, n + 1} is
to choose {xi,nj,t } to maximize Ei,nt [− exp(−γW i,nt+1)]:
max
{xH ,xF }∈R2
Ei,nt [− exp(−γ(xHsH,t+1 + xF sF,t+1))] , (4)
where Ei,nt [·] is the (subjective) expectation with respect to a joint Gaussian distribution
that we will define below. Note that, when xi,nj,t is negative, generation n of country i is
short-selling the risky asset of country j at time t.
11
t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4
(t− 2)-cohort
consumes
(t− 1)-cohort
trades
(t− 1)-cohort
consumes
t-cohort
is born and trades
t-cohort
trades
t-cohort
consumes
(t+ 1)-cohort
is born and trades
(t+ 1)-cohort
trades
(t+ 2)-cohort
trades
(t+ 3)-cohort
trades
Figure 1: Timeline.
2.2 The Learning Model
Over time, agents learn about those aspects of the stochastic output process they are
uncertain about. In order to capture experience effects and recency bias, we allow agents
to depart from the standard Bayesian learning paradigm in terms of how they weight
past observations when they form their beliefs. However, we also want to retain some
of the convenient features of the Bayesian framework, namely the concept of belief over
subjective models. We do so by implementing the generalization of Bayesian updating
in Bissiri et al. (2016). We will show that their generalization implies that seemingly
dissimilar learning procedures used in economics — such as Bayesian and frequentist
learning, and departures from these such as “pseudo Bayesian” and experience-based
learning (EBL) as in Malmendier et al. (2018) — can be cast as part of an encompassing
class. Thus, we think this generalization might be of independent interest for modeling
departures of Bayesian learning, and we present it in more generality than needed for
this paper.
We first describe agents’ subjective model, i. e., the parametrizations of the stochastic
12
process that the agents consider. Second, we describe the extension of Bayesian updating
proposed in Bissiri et al. (2016). We then provide a series of examples that illustrate the
scope of this framework and study the learning specification used in this paper.
2.2.1 Agents’ subjective model
Agents want to learn about the distribution of the process (yt)
∞
t=0 where yt = (yF,t, yH,t)
for all t ∈ N0. As we assume this process is iid, it suffices to specify the density function
for yt.
14 The subjective model is given by a family of density functions, {qθ : θ ∈ Θ}
where qθ is a joint probability of the output vector (yF , yH), parametrized by θ ∈ Θ, and
Θ is the parameter set. The mapping θ 7→ qθ is one-to-one so that each index θ fully
characterizes one (and only one) density.
Agents are uncertain only about the output process, and use data on past realizations
of output to form beliefs about the densities in the subjective model that best fit the data.
As typically assumed in the literature, agents correctly understand the process driving
prices, i. e., the equilibrium mapping from output realizations to prices (see equation (10)
below).15
2.2.2 Agents’ Beliefs
The objective is to model the belief of the generation n at time t ≥ n in country i, which
is formally defined as a probability measure over the parameter set, i. e., µi,nt ∈ P(Θ)
where P(Θ) denotes the set of probability measures over Θ.
The learning problem of the generation n in country i is as follows. Given a prior µi0 ∈
P(Θ), a scaling parameter % > 0 and, for each time t, a loss function, `i,nt : R2t×Θ→ R,
14The iid assumption is done for simplicity; it is straightforward to extend the framework to a Markov
model for output.
15Extending this assumption, while outside the scope of this paper, is not difficult. It requires consid-
ering a subjective model over the process of output and prices, where agents use past realization of all
variables to update their beliefs.
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the posterior of generation n at time t ≥ n in country i, is
µi,nt = arg min
ν∈P(Θ)
∫
`i,nt (y0:t, θ)ν(dθ) + %DIV (ν, µ
i
0),
where DIV (ν, µ) ≡ ∫ log dν
dµ
(θ)ν(dθ) is the KL divergence and y0:t = (y0, ..., yt).
16
This optimization problem can be interpreted through the lens of rational inattention
(see Mac´kowiak et al. (2018) for a nice review) in the sense that the agent is “buying” a
belief to maximize the payoff −`i,nt and paying a “cost” given by −%DIV (·, µi0). In fact,
for % > 0, the solution is given by
µi,nt (A) =
∫
A
exp{−`i,nt (y0:t, θ)/%}µi0(dθ)∫
Θ
exp{−`i,nt (y0:t, θ)/%}µi0(dθ)
for any Borel set A ⊆ Θ. It is easy to see that in fact µi,nt ∈ P(Θ). For % = 0, µi,nt puts
probability one to arg minθ∈Θ `
i,n
t (y0:t, θ); thus, % = 0 characterizes “frequentist” learning
scheme. We now discuss some examples.
2.2.3 Examples
Bayesian Learners. First consider the case where the loss function is given by the
log-likelihood function, i. e., `i,nt (y0:t, θ) ≡ −(t + 1)−1
∑t
k=0 log qθ(yk). If % = (t + 1)
−1,
then
µi,nt (A) =
∫
A
∏t
k=0 qθ(yk)µ
i
0(dθ)∫
Θ
∏t
k=0 qθ(yk)µ
i
0(dθ)
, ∀ A ⊆ Θ Borel
which is the standard Bayesian posterior for the subjective model {qθ : θ ∈ Θ} given prior
µi0. If % = 0, then µ
i,n
t puts probability one to the maximum likelihood estimator, thus
modeling the beliefs of a “frequentist” using the log-likelihood as the loss function.
16Formally θ 7→ f(θ) ≡ dνdµ (θ) is the derivative of µ with respect to ν, i. e.,
∫
A
f(θ)µ(dθ) = ν(A) for
any Borel set A. It is well-defined provided ν is absolutely continuous with respect to µ. If this is not
the case, we simply set DIV to ∞.
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Learners from experience. Motivated by the prior empirical evidence on expe-
rience effects, we are interested in agents who do not attach equal weight to all past
observations. Under our formulation, this feature can easily be captured by simply con-
sidering a different loss function given by `i,nn+age(y0:n+age, θ) ≡ −
∑n+age
k=0 $(k) log qθ(yk),
where ($(k))n+agek=0 are weights chosen by the researcher and n+ age is the calendar time,
decomposed in the generation n’s birth year and age.
For instance, in order to model a “pseudo-Bayesian learner” who only considers obser-
vations during his lifetime (cf. Malmendier et al. (2018)), we set $(k) = 0 for all k < n
and $(k) = 1
age+1
for all k ∈ {n, ..., n+ age}, and % = 1
age+1
, and thus obtain
µi,nn+age(A) =
∫
A
∏n+age
k=n qθ(yk)µ
i
0(dθ)∫
Θ
∏n+age
k=n qθ(yk)µ
i
0(dθ)
, ∀ A ⊆ Θ Borel.
To model the case for experience-based learners who also overweight recent observations
(as modeled in Malmendier et al. (2018)), we set w(k) = 0 for all k < n and ($(k))n+agek=n
to be increasing, e. g, $(k) = β
n+age−k∑age
b=0 β
age−b for all k ∈ {n, ..., n + age} where β ∈ (0, 1). In
this case, with % = 1, it follows that
µi,nn+age(A) =
∫
A
∏n+age
k=n qθ(yk)
$(k)µi0(dθ)∫
Θ
∏n+age
k=n qθ(yk)
$(k)µi0(dθ)
, ∀ A ⊆ Θ Borel.
The Gaussian Case. We denote the specification we will use throughout the rest
of the paper as the “Gaussian Case.” For country i ∈ {H,F}, the subjective model is
Gaussian with covariance matrix Σ = σ2I, and the prior µi0 is also Gaussian, with mean
(mii,m
i
j) and covariance matrix Σ0 ≡ [1/τ ii , 0; 0, 1/τ ij ] for j 6= i. The parameter set is
Θ = R2, i. e., agents only learn about the mean of the subjective model and the two
output processes are independent.
For general weights ($(k))n+agek=n , the posterior of generation n at time n + age ≥ n in
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country i is
µi,nn+age = arg min
ν∈P(Θ)
∫ n+age∑
k=n
{
0.5$(k)(yk − θ)TΣ−1(yk − θ)
}
ν(θ)dθ + %DIV (ν, µi0).
For % = 0, it follows that µi,nn+age will assign probability one to θˆ
i,n
n+age = (θˆ
i,n
i,n+age, θˆ
i,n
j,n+age) ≡∑n+age
k=n $(k)yk. For % = 1, it follows that:
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Proposition 2.1. The posterior belief µi,nn+age of generation n at time n + age ≥ n in
country i ∈ {H,F} is the product of two Gaussians with means
θˆi,nj,n+age =
age+ 1
age+ 1 + τ ijσ
2
1
age+ 1
n+age∑
k=n
$(k)yj,k +m
i
i
τ ijσ
2
age+ 1 + τ ijσ
2
and variances
σi,nj,n+age =
σ2
age+ 1 + τ ijσ
2
,
for any j ∈ {H,F}.
Throughout the paper, we make three additional assumptions. First, we focus on
constant weights, i. e., $(k) = 1 for all k ∈ {n, ..., n+age}. Generalizing this assumption
to allow for more flexible weight profiles — for instance, profiles that model recency bias
— will be interesting when considering longer-lived agents.
Second, we impose symmetry in the precisions, in the sense that τ ≡ τ ii and τ ∗ ≡ τ ji
for all j 6= i and any i ∈ {H,F}. (Here and in other instances, we use a star ∗ to indicate
“foreign country” when the context does not require keeping track of all the information
in the indices, allowing us to highlight cross-country symmetries.) Given Proposition
2.1, this assumption readily implies symmetry in the posterior standard deviation, i. e.,
17The fact that we consider % = 1 — as opposed to any % > 0 — comes with little loss of generality
because what matters for the posterior belief is %σ2 and not % individually.
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σage ≡ σi,ni,n+age and σ∗age ≡ σj,ni,n+age for any j 6= i and any i ∈ {H,F}. In addition, this
assumption also implies symmetry on the weights of the posterior mean, i. e., for any
i ∈ {H,F} and any j 6= i,
θˆi,ni,n+age = wage
n+age∑
k=n
ω(age)yj,k + (1− wage)mii (5)
θˆi,nj,n+age = w
∗
age
n+age∑
k=n
ω(age)yj,k + (1− w∗age)mij (6)
where wage ≡ age+1age+1+τσ2 , w∗age ≡ age+1age+1+τ∗σ2 and ω(age) = 1/(age+ 1).
Third, we assume that domestic agents have more precise prior beliefs about their own
country’s output than about the foreign country’s output, i. e., τ ∗ < τ . This assumption
captures the idea that agents feel more confident about their knowledge of their own
country, which they have experienced since childhood, than about their knowledge of the
foreign country. This could be due to over-confidence, to early life experiences, or to some
form of inter-generational information transmission. As agents have more precise priors
about their own country’s output, and all agents observe the same information, agents
will also have more precise posteriors about their own country’s output. As a result, the
posterior standard deviation for foreign output will be higher than for domestic output,
σage < σ
∗
age, for any age (i. e., cohort). In addition, old agents have more “experience”
than younger agents, and thus have a more precise posterior belief for a given country’s
output: σage > σage+1 and σ
∗
age > σ
∗
age+1.
We conclude this part by pointing out that, under experience-based learning, the prior
has a non-vanishing role on the formation of beliefs. Moreover, the weight that an agent
assigns to the output realization yj,t for j ∈ {H,F} when forming her beliefs varies
with her age ∈ {0, 1} and her country of origin i ∈ {H,F}. These features, which are
not present in the standard Bayesian learning, are key to generate heterogeneity on the
response to macroeconomics shocks of different generations in different countries, and as
17
such, are key drivers of the results in the paper.
2.3 Equilibrium Definition
We now proceed to define the equilibrium of the economy.
Definition 2.1 (Equilibrium). An equilibrium is a demand profile for the risky assets
{xi,nj,t }, a demand profile for the risk-free asset {ai,nt }, and price schedules {pj,t} such that
1. given the price schedule, {(xi,nH,t, xi,nF,t, ai,nt ) : t ∈ {n, n + 1}} solve the maximization
problem (4) of generation n in country i ∈ {H,F};
2. markets clear in all t ∈ N0:
1 =
1
4
(
xH,tH,t + x
H,t−1
H,t + x
F,t
H,t + x
F,t−1
H,t
)
, (7)
1 =
1
4
(
xH,tF,t + x
H,t−1
F,t + x
F,t
F,t + x
F,t−1
F,t
)
. (8)
We denote country i’s aggregate demand of the asset of country j as
X ij,t ≡
1
4
(
xi,tj,t + x
i,t−1
j,t
)
(9)
the portfolio of risky assets of country i at time t as X¯ it ≡ {X iH,t, X iF,t}. Finally, we focus
the analysis on the class of linear equilibria, i. e., equilibria with affine prices:
Definition 2.2 (Linear Equilibrium). A linear equilibrium is an equilibrium wherein
prices are an affine function of output realizations. That is, there exists a K ∈ N,
αj ∈ R, βj,k, β∗i,k ∈ R for all k ∈ {0, ..., K}, such that
pj,t = αj +
K∑
k=0
βj,k · yj,t−k +
K∑
k=0
β∗i,k · yi,t−k. (10)
for all j, i ∈ {H,F} with i 6= j.
18
3 Equilibrium Characterization
3.1 Full-Information Benchmark
Before we analyze the equilibrium portfolio choices under learning, we derive the demand
for risky assets in the benchmark case of known mean outputs θH and θF . In this scenario,
there are no disagreements across cohorts nor across countries. The demands of any cohort
trading at time t solve (4). The solution to this problem is standard, with
xi,nj,t =
Ei,nt [sj,t+1]
γV i,nt [sj,t+1]
(11)
for all n ∈ {t − 1, t}, and zero otherwise. As all agents share the same posterior beliefs
Ei,nt [yj,t+1] = θj for all i, j, n, t, there is no heterogeneity in cohorts’ demands. As each
risky asset is in unit supply, market clearing implies xi,nj,t = 1 for all n ∈ {t − 1, t}, and
zero otherwise. Furthermore, there exists a unique equilibrium with prices pj =
θj−γσ2
R−1
for all t.18
3.2 EBL: Symmetric Countries Benchmark
We now return to EBL agents, and first characterize portfolio choice in an economy with
no heterogeneity across countries. That is, agents do not know output means and are
learning through EBL, but they share prior beliefs about all outputs. The main results
are summarized in the following Lemma.
Lemma 3.1. If all agents are born with the same prior belief about domestic and foreign
output, then all countries hold the same fraction of the world portfolio. As a result,
18 Our analysis focuses on Fundamental Equilibria, as we rule out the presence of price bubbles.
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aggregate holdings of domestic and foreign assets are
XHH,t = X
F
H,t = X
H
F,t = X
F
F,t = 1, (12)
and thus, do not vary with output realizations.
When countries share prior beliefs, τ = τ ∗, efficient-portfolio theory holds. Both
countries hold a fraction of the world portfolio, which implies that there is no home bias
in portfolio holdings, nor cyclicality in capital flows. This is true even though agents form
beliefs using their lifetime experiences. Within a country, however, individual cohorts
need not hold the world portfolio. Instead, deviations of young agents from the world
portfolio are off-set by deviations of old agents in that same country, so that the efficient-
portfolio result holds in aggregate.
The results in Lemma 3.1 have important implications for international flows. They
suggest that with symmetric prior beliefs and equal demographics of market participants,
domestic, foreign, or local booms or recessions should have no impact on a country’s
aggregate portfolio holdings, and thus international flows. In what follows, we show how
asymmetries between countries overturn this result.
3.3 Equilibrium Demands Under EBL
We now allow for countries to not be perfectly symmetric. In particular, we suppose that
agents have more precise prior distributions about their own country’s output than the
foreign country’s output, τ > τ ∗. We begin by analyzing the demands of generation n in
country i ∈ {H,F} at time t, given prices pj,t, by solving problem (4).
Proposition 3.1. The demand of generation n ∈ {t, t − 1} in country i ∈ {H,F} for
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the risky asset of country j ∈ {H,F} at time t is
xi,nj,t =
Ei,nt [yj,t+1 + pj,t+1]−Rpj,t
γV i,nt [yj,t+1 + pj,t+1]
, (13)
and the demand for the risk-free asset of cohort n in country i at time t is
ai,nt =W i,nt − xi,nH,tpH,t − xi,nF,tpF,t. (14)
With these demands, we can impose market clearing to solve for market prices of the
risky asset of country j ∈ {H,F}:
∑
n∈{t,t−1}
(
1
4
EH,nt [yj,t+1 + pj,t+1]−Rpj,t
γV H,nt [yj,t+1 + pj,t+1]
+
1
4
EF,nt [yj,t+1 + pj,t+1]−Rpj,t
γV F,nt [yj,t+1 + pj,t+1]
)
= 1 (15)
To solve this, we guess that the price of the asset of country j at time t is given by
equation (10). We use the method of undetermined coefficients to verify our guess and
solve for the price loadings to fully characterize the behavior of equilibrium asset prices in
this economy. Results are summarized in the following Proposition, where we use again
the simplified subindices 0 and 1 for “the young” and “the old” with subindices 0 and 1
(more generally, an agent’s age).
Proposition 3.2. The equilibrium price of the asset of country j ∈ {H,F} at time t is
given by
pj,t = αj + βj,0yj,t + βj,1yj,t−1 (16)
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where
βj,0 =
ΣR
ΣR− 14
{
w0
σ20
+ w1ω
σ21
+
w∗0
σ∗20
+
w∗1ω
σ∗21
+ 1R
(
w1(1−ω)
σ21
+
w∗1(1−ω)
σ∗21
)} − 1
βj,1 = (1 + βi,0)
(1− ω)
4ΣR
{
w1
σ21
+
w∗1
σ∗21
}
αj =
(1 + βi,0)
Σ (R− 1)
(
1− w0
σ20
+
1− w1
σ21
+
1− w∗0
σ∗20
+
1− w∗1
σ∗21
)
m− γ (1 + βi,0)
2
Σ (R− 1)
for Σ ≡ 1
4
(
1
σ20
+ 1
σ21
+ 1
σ∗20
+ 1
σ∗21
)
.
Proposition 3.2 makes two important points. First, the price of output in country i
only varies with realizations of output of that same country. This result relies on the
assumption that agents (correctly) believe that outputs are independently distributed
across countries. Second, the price of output depends on past output realizations that
have been observed by at least one market participant. That is, prices are sensitive to
past output realizations that have been experienced by (some) market participants.
With these results in hand, we can compute the holdings of both risky assets for each
cohort in each country as a function of past output realizations and analyze the effect of
output shocks on cross-country flows.
At time t, the holdings of cohort n ∈ {t, t − 1} in country i ∈ {H,F} of assets from
country i and j ∈ {H,F} 6= i are
xi,ti,t =
α˜i + (1 + β0,i) (1− w0)m
γ (1 + β0,i)
2
σ20
+
w0 (1 + β0,i) + β1,i −Rβ0,i
γ (1 + β0,i)
2
σ20
yi,t − Rβ1,i
γ (1 + β0,i)
2
σ20
yi,t−1
xi,t−1i,t =
α˜i + (1 + β0,i) (1− w1)m
γ (1 + β0,i)
2
σ21
+
w1 (1 + β0,i)ω + β1,i −Rβ0,i
γ (1 + β0,i)
2
σ21
yi,t +
w1 (1 + β0,i) (1− ω)−Rβ1,i
γ (1 + β0,i)
2
σ21
yi,t−1
xi,tj,t =
α˜j + (1 + β0,j) (1− w∗0)m
γ (1 + β0,j)
2
σ∗20
+
w∗0 (1 + β0,j) + β1,j −Rβ0,j
γ (1 + β0,j)
2
σ∗20
yj,t − Rβ1,j
γ (1 + β0,j)
2
σ∗20
yj,t−1
xi,t−1j,t =
α˜j + (1 + β0,j) (1− w∗1)m
γ (1 + β0,j)
2
σ∗21
+
w∗1 (1 + β0,j)ω + β1,j −Rβ0,j
γ (1 + β0,j)
2
σ∗21
yj,t +
w∗1 (1 + β0,j) (1− ω)−Rβ1,j
γ (1 + β0,j)
2
σ∗21
yj,t−1
where α˜i = αi(1−R) and ω ≡ ω(1) = 12 as defined in (5). (We have dropped ω(0) = 1.)
We now introduce the notion of home bias in portfolio holdings for our two-country
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economy.
Definition 3.1 (Home Bias). We say that there is home bias in portfolio holdings at
time t when
HBt ≡ XHH,t −XHF,t > 0.
Due to the symmetry embedded in the model, it is sufficient to compare a country’s
holdings of domestic versus foreign assets to assess the presence of home bias in portfolio
holdings. As the world portfolio is given by one unit of the domestic asset and one unit of
the foreign asset, no home bias in portfolio holdings would imply XHH,t = X
H
F,t = X
F
H,t =
XFF,t = 1. That is, all countries hold the same fraction of assets of the H and F country,
and thus HBt = 0. Finally, due to market clearing, HBt > 0 implies that X
F
F,t−XFH,t > 0
as well, so it is WLOG to focus on the holdings of country H.
We also introduce the notion of booms and recessions in individual countries, defined
as periods when positive or negative macro-shocks follow a period of output stability in
both countries.
Definition 3.2 (Booms and Recessions). We say that there is a recession in country i
at time t when yi,t−1 = yj,t = yj,t−1 = y¯ and yi,t < y¯. Analogously, we say that there is a
boom in country i at time t when yi,t−1 = yj,t = yj,t−1 = y¯ and yi,t > y¯.
We can now show that home bias in portfolio holdings arises in a world with experience-
based learners, who believe to have more precise priors about their home country’s output.
Proposition 3.3 (Home Bias). If prior beliefs are centered around the truth, i. e., mii =
mji = θi, there will be home bias in portfolio holdings in expectations:
E
[
XHH,t −XHF,t
]
> 0,
where E[·] is the unconditional expectations operator over the true distribution of outputs.
23
Intuitively, home bias arises because a more precise domestic prior implies that do-
mestic agents perceive less risk when investing in the domestic than in the foreign asset:
σ2age < σ
∗2
age, where age ∈ {0, 1}. As a result, all else equal, they are more willing than
foreigners to hold the domestic relative to the foreign asset, generating home bias in
portfolio holdings.
A more precise domestic prior belief has a second implication: Domestic agents put
more weight on their prior belief about domestic output than foreign agents do when
computing their posterior mean, i. e., 1 − wage > 1 − w∗age. From inspection of posterior
means (5), it follows that agents under-react to domestic shocks relative to foreign shocks,
wage < w
∗
age, when forming their beliefs. As a result, after a negative shock, we observe
an inflow of domestic funds together with an outflow of foreign funds, increasing home
bias in portfolio holdings, generating cyclicality of capital flows:
Proposition 3.4 (Cyclicality of Flows). After a recession in country i at time t, we
observe an inflow of domestic funds, X ii,t −X ii,t−1 > 0 (retrenchment), and an outflow of
foreign funds, Xji,t −Xji,t−1 < 0 (fickleness). The opposite flow pattern follows a boom in
country i.
Proposition 3.4 suggests that our model can rationalize two patterns of international
flows that have been identified in the literature (Broner et al., 2013, Forbes and Warnock,
2012) and that are hard to explain with standard models that also rationalize home bias.
First, there is an inflow of domestic funds during domestic crises – retrenchment. Second,
there is an outflow of foreign funds during domestic crises – fickleness.
Broner et al. (2006) and Milesi-Ferretti and Tille (2011) find that during global down-
turns all countries experience a retrenchment of funds. This is also true in our model. If
we define global downturns as periods in which both countries are in a recession, then the
model predicts that agents disinvest in foreign assets while investing in domestic assets.
To the extent that outputs are correlated in the real world, then the same pattern is
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likely to be observed after domestic crisis as well.
4 Heterogeneity in Market Participation
To analyze the effect of demographics on capital flows, we now allow for different de-
mographics of market participants across countries. There are many reasons for such
differences in participants’ demographics. First, the difference could be driven by dif-
ferences in the country’s overall demographics due to cross-country variation in fertility
and mortality rates. Second, cultural reasons or market frictions might induce different
generations to participate or exit the market at different points in their lives. Our simple
model does not formalize the exogenous and endogenous reasons for the differences in
market demographics; but we believe that our reduced-form approach captures some of
the forces at play when demographics do differ across countries.
In our simple OLG setting, we denote by φiage the mass of agents of age ∈ {0, 1} in
country i that participate in the market for risky claims. Agents that do not participate
in the market invest all of their wealth in the safe asset/technology.19
Our equilibrium definition then needs to be adjusted, as the new market clearing
condition states that in all t ∈ N0:
1 =φH0 x
H,t
H,t + φ
H
1 x
H,t−1
H,t + φ
F
0 x
F,t
H,t + φ
F
1 x
F,t−1
H,t , (17)
1 =φH0 x
H,t
F,t + φ
H
1 x
H,t−1
F,t + φ
F
0 x
F,t
F,t + φ
F
1 x
F,t−1
F,t . (18)
By using our linear guess for prices, plugging in the posterior means and variances into
equation (15), and using the method of undetermined coefficients, we obtain the following
adjusted expressions that fully characterize prices for the asset of country i ∈ {H,F}
19Formally, in each country, each cohort (young and old) faces a positive probability of being able to
access the market for risky asset, so that in equilibrium the demographics of market participants is given
by {φiage}.
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when market participations differ across countries:
βi,0 =
ΣR
ΣR−
{
φi0
σ20
w0 +
φi1
σ21
w1ω +
φj0
σ∗20
w∗0 +
φj1
σ∗21
w∗1ω +
(1−ω)
R
(
φi1
σ21
w1 +
φj1
σ∗21
w∗1
)} − 1
βi,1 =
(1 + βi,0) (1− ω)
ΣR
{
φi1
σ21
w1 +
φj1
σ∗21
w∗1
}
(19)
αi =
(1 + βi,0)
Σ (R− 1)
(
φi0
σ20
(1− w0) + φ
i
1
σ21
(1− w1) + φ
j
0
σ∗20
(1− w∗0) +
φj1
σ∗21
(1− w∗1)
)
m− γ (1 + βi,0)
2
Σ (R− 1)
where Σ ≡ φi0
σ20
+
φi1
σ21
+
φj0
σ∗20
+
φj1
σ∗21
and all other price loadings are zero.20
Portfolio holdings and prices depend on the mass of young and old agents in countries
H and F , as different agents have different prior beliefs and experiences, and thus their
weights matter for aggregate asset demand. We compute the portfolio holdings of each
cohort in equilibrium and analyze how different demographics of market participation
affect the sensitivity of flows to output shocks that was characterized in Proposition 3.4.
Proposition 4.1. There exist thresholds τ¯1, τ¯2 ∈ (τ ∗, σ−2) such that the cyclicality of
capital flows, i. e., the sensitivity of domestic portfolio holdings to domestic output shocks,
varies with demographics as follows
∂
∂φj0
(
∂Xii,t
∂yi,t
)
=
φi0
σ20σ
∗2
0
(w0 − w∗0) +
φi1
σ∗20 σ21
(w1ω − w∗0) < 0. (20)
∂
∂φj1
(
∂Xii,t
∂yi,t
)
=
φi0
σ20σ
∗2
1
(w0 − w∗1ω) +
φi1
σ21σ
∗2
1
(w1 − w∗1)ω > 0, if and only if τ < τ¯1. (21)
∂
∂φi0
(
∂Xii,t
∂yi,t
)
=
φj0
σ20σ
∗2
0
(w0 − w∗0) +
φj1
σ20σ
∗2
1
(w0 − w∗1ω) > 0, if and only if τ < τ¯2. (22)
∂
∂φi1
(
∂Xii,t
∂yi,t
)
=
φj0
σ∗20 σ21
(w1ω − w∗0) +
φj1
σ21σ
∗2
1
(w1 − w∗1)ω < 0. (23)
with the opposite sign for changes in the sensitivity of foreign portfolio holdings to do-
mestic output shocks, i. e.,
∂Xij,t
∂yi,t
.
20These results are derived in the Proof of Proposition 3.2 in Appendix A
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The first important result from Proposition 4.1 is that portfolios holdings of the do-
mestic asset, and thus capital flows, are more sensitive to domestic output shocks as the
mass of young foreign agents increases, equation (20), or equivalently as the mass of old
domestic agents increases, equation (23). This is because young foreign agents react the
most to such shocks, increasing prices and thus causing a larger decrease in domestic de-
mand for the domestic asset. Old domestic agents instead react the least, further reducing
the response of domestic demand for the domestic asset. As for the effect of the young
domestic and old foreign agents, the result is ambiguous. This is because it now matters
who has a more precise posterior: young domestic agent with no experience but precise
priors, or old foreign agents with experience but less precise priors. The conditions on the
domestic precision indicate exactly the point in which the effect of a more precise prior
precision dominates, which implies that a higher number of domestic young agents or of
old foreign agents dampens the sensitivity of capital flows to domestic output shocks.
5 Empirical Implications
The theoretical framework illustrates that the concept of experience-based learning, which
has been shown to play a significant role in investor belief formation in the domestic
context, may also help explain international capital flows. In this section, we turn to the
empirical regularities of home bias and the cyclicality of capital flows, and test whether
the predictions of EBL regarding the relation of these regularities with demographics hold
in the data.
First, we re-estimate the existence and extent of home bias, in line with results in
Proposition 3.3. Second, we analyze the cyclicality of capital flows, as predicted by
Proposition 3.4: Is there an inflow of domestic funds (retrenchment) and an outflow
of foreign funds (fickleness) during domestic crises? Finally, we test if the sensitivity
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of capital flows to output shocks varies with demographics as predicted by Proposition
4.1: Are portfolio holdings of domestic assets, and thus capital flows, more sensitive to
domestic output shocks when the fraction of the older (domestic) population is higher?
5.1 Data
Our main sources of data are the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) International
Financial Statistics (IFS), including its International Investment Positions (IIP) data; the
IMF’s Balance of Payments (BOP) data, the World Bank’s World Development Indicators
(WDI), and the United Nations’ (UN) data on World Population Prospects (WPP).
The main data series extracted from these data sets for the empirical analysis are yearly
measures of Home Bias in the US, capital outflows by domestic agents (COD), capital
inflows by foreign agents (CIF), and the growth of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP
growth). We define and discuss all measures below. More details about the sources
of data and the construction of the key variables are in Appendix B, including some
summary statistics in Table B.1.
5.2 Home Bias
Equity home bias is “the empirical phenomenon that investors portfolios are concentrated
in domestic equities to a much greater degree than justified by portfolio theory” (Cooper
et al., 2013). It has been well documented in the literature both at an aggregate level
(Cooper et al., 2013, Cooper and Kaplanis, 1986, French and Poterba, 1991, Mishra,
2015) and at the fund level (Hau and Rey, 2008). Experience-based learning offers an
explanation for the persistence of home bias in equity as well as the variation in the extent
of home bias over time: It should increase when a country has a negative growth/GDP
shock. Below we will test the (refined) hypotheses that domestic investors increase their
investment in domestic assets (less domestic outflows) after a negative GDP growth shock
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and that foreigners decrease their investment in domestic assets (less foreign inflows) after
a negative GDP growth shock, which will imply that home bias increases.
For completeness, we start by providing evidence on the existence of equity home bias
throughout our sample period, which extends prior evidence on equity home bias. These
estimations aim to confirm its persistence throughout a longer time period and for more
recent years than established in prior literature.
We focus on US home bias and map our two-country model to the US versus the rest-
of-the world (ROW). We measure US home bias as the difference between the percentage
of US equity held domestically (i. e., domestic equity investment by the US divided by
the global equity investment by the US) and a measure of optimal asset location. For
the latter measure, we use the US share of global market capitalization, which is the
traditional benchmark in prior research on home bias (Berkel, 2007, Brealey et al., 1999,
Cooper et al., 2013, Cooper and Kaplanis, 1986). Thus, home bias is calculated as:
Domestic Equity Investment in the US
Global Equity Investment by the US
− US Market Capitalization
Global Market Capitalization
.
We obtain data on domestic and foreign equity investment in the US and globally from
the IIP data of the IMF, available for 1976-2017, and capitalization data from the World
Federation of Exchanges, available from the World Bank’s WDI data for 1980-2017.
Table B.1 provides the summary statistics of the resulting measure of home bias. We
see that home bias has been large and persistent with a minimum value of 32%, a mean
of 44%, and a standard deviation of only 9%.
To illustrate the extent of US home bias over our sample period, we plot US home bias
from 1980 to 2017 in Figure 2. As the graph shows, home bias has remained large and
persistent over our 38-year sample period, never dropping below 30% in our almost 40-year
sample. For the analysis in this paper, we do not focus on the year-to-year changes. The
influence of experience-based learning is measurable over medium- to long-term horizons
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Figure 2: US Home Bias by Year
(as discussed in Malmendier et al. (2018)), and we abstract from short-term factors such
as market revaluation in the regression analyses shown in the next subsection.
5.3 Cyclicality of Capital Flows: Fickleness and Retrenchment
Fickleness is defined as the tendency of foreign investors to exit when a country is in
distress, and retrenchment as the tendency of local investors to reduce their foreign
investments and “bring home their global liquidity” during domestic distress (Caballero
and Simsek, 2018). These patterns have been documented in prior literature, although
they are less well established than home bias. Proposition 3.4 shows that experience-based
learning offers an explanation for fickleness and entrenchment. Here, we corroborate the
empirical patterns using more current data and a different panel structure.
We construct measures of capital flows from yearly changes in a country’s investments
abroad, assets, and foreign countries’ investments domestically, liabilities, in the Balance
of Payments (BOP) data of the IMF.21 To capture changes in foreign countries’ invest-
21Broner et al. (2013) used inflows and outflows variables, which are included in the 5th edition of the
BOP manual. We follow Caballero and Simsek (2018) and use the 6th edition, which defines variables
in terms of assets and liabilities instead of outflows and inflows.
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ments domestically, we calculate capital inflows by foreign agents (CIF) as the sum of
changes in a country’s liabilities from direct investment, portfolio investment, and other
investment from the financial account. To capture changes in the domestic country’s
investments abroad, we calculate capital outflows of domestic agents (COD) as the sum
of changes in a country’s assets from direct investment, portfolio investment, other in-
vestment, and reserve assets from the financial account. We include the 19 countries
represented in the G20, as these countries are all of a certain size, involved with interna-
tional finance, and notable enough so that news of income shocks will reach the global
investment community. We inflation-adjust all capital-flow values and, following Broner
et al. (2013) and Caballero and Simsek (2018), normalize them by trend GDP and stan-
dardize to a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one (at the level of each country).
The resulting data series runs from 1970-2017, varying by country.
To proxy for domestic crises, or output shocks, we follow Broner et al. (2013) and
focus on how output varies during the business cycle (rather than calculating indicators
for income shocks across countries, which are hard to reliably define). We use yearly
GDP data in contemporaneous US dollars from the World Bank, running from 1970-2017
(varying by country). To calculate real GDP growth, we first inflation adjust the GDP
data,22 and then calculate current-year real GDP minus prior-year real GDP, all divided
by prior-year real GDP. The resulting panel of real GDP growth runs from 1971-2017
(varying by country), since we lack a prior year for the 1970 calculation. We note that,
while quarterly GDP data is also available (from the IFS), we use yearly data from the
WDI, mirroring Broner et al. (2013), as the annual data provides better coverage across
time for most countries.
For further details on data sources, see Appendix B.
22As Balance of Payments (BOP) data is recorded in contemporaneous US dollars, as opposed to the
local currency unit, we start with GDP data in contemporaneous US dollars so that our calculations are
parallel.
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With these variables at hand, we test Proposition 3.4 in our new panel. Proposition
3.4 predicts that, during a bust, domestic investors retrench by pulling money out of
foreign countries to invest at home, and foreign investors become “fickle” and pull money
out of the domestic country. The opposite effects hold during booms. These predictions
imply that foreign investment in the domestic country and domestic investment abroad
are both pro-cyclical, i. e., positively correlated with GDP growth or other measures of
the business cycle.
To test these predictions, and confirm the results of Broner et al. (2013) for our ex-
tended time period and the selected set of countries, we estimate the following empirical
model:
Yi,t = αi + γi · t+ β1 ·%∆GDPi,t + i,t,
where i indexes countries, t indexes/represents the time period, Yi,t is the flow variable for
a given country year, αi is the country fixed effect, γi is the linear time trend coefficient,
β1 is the coefficient of interest, %∆GDPi,t is real GDP growth between t and t− 1, and
i,t is the error term.
Our model of experience based learning predicts a positive coefficient estimate β1 on
GDP growth, both when we use the CIF measure of capital inflows of foreigners and when
we use the COD measure of capital outflows of domestics as the outcome variable Yi,t.
Moreover, this prediction is consistent with the results of Broner et al. (2013) (in their
Table 3) that both CIF and COD correlate positively with GDP, implying that both CIF
and COD are pro-cyclical.
Table 1 shows the regression results, with the CIF measure of capital flows as the
outcome variable in column (1), and the COD measure in column (2). As the estimates
reveal, we find the predicted positive relationship with our measure for the business cycle
booms, real GDP growth. In both regressions, the estimates for the coefficient of interest
are significant, controlling for country fixed effects and a country specific linear trend.
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Table 1: Business Cycles and Flows
CIF are the sum of changes in a country’s liabilities from direct investment, portfolio investment,
and other investment from the financial account divided by trend GDP and standardized at the
country level. COD are the sum of changes in a country’s assets from direct investment, portfolio
investment, other investment, and reserve assets from the financial account divided by trend
GDP and standardized at the country level. Real GDP Growth is the percent GDP growth.
(1) (2)
CIF COD
Real GDP Growth 0.832∗∗ 1.852∗∗∗
(2.68) (7.64)
Country FE X X
Country Linear Trend X X
Country Clustered SE X X
Income Group G20 G20
R2 0.188 0.261
N 710 720
Number of Countries 19 19
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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5.4 Cyclicality of Capital Flows and Demographics
Having confirmed the persistence of home bias, fickleness, and retrenchment in our data,
we now move to the implications of Proposition 4.1 which are novel and specific to the
EBL framework.
An empirical prediction arising from Proposition 4.1 is that an increase in the older
domestic population of market participants increases the business-cycle sensitivity of
flows. This is because the domestic old population has the strongest prior among all
demographic groups. As a result, a domestic recession has the least impact on the beliefs
of older domestic investors. In other words, older domestic investors believe that other
demographic groups are underestimating domestic production and that the domestic asset
is under-priced, leading to retrenchment.23
Proposition 4.1 does not offer a prediction whether a larger young domestic population
will increase or decrease the flow sensitivity to business cycle fluctuations. The reason
is that it is unclear how the domestic young agents react relative to the foreign old
agents: The former are endowed with a more precise prior, but the latter group has more
experience. We will explore the relationship as an empirical question in the data.
In order to perform these empirical tests, we introduce four country-level indicator
variables for both median and top-quartile population statistics, and the old and young
population. These indicator variables equal one if a country has an above median, or
(alternatively) a top-quartile level of young or old investors, respectively. Following Mal-
mendier et al. (2018), who consider those aged 25 to 75 the investor population, we define
the young investor population of a country as those aged 25 to 49 and the old investor
population as those aged 50 to 74. To measure population mass, we use data on yearly,
country-level population data in 5-year age bins from the World Population Prospects
23Note that, for these comparative statics, we are not assuming that the total population remains
constant: An increase in the number of old agents is not equivalent to a decrease in the number of young
agents.
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(WPP) provided by the United Nations (UN). More details are in Appendix B.
To test our prediction, we extend the regression specification of Table 1. As before,
we regress a flow variable, CIF or COD, on real GDP growth, a country fixed effect,
and a country linear time trend, but we add interactions of GDP growth with indicators
for high old investor population and, for completenesss, high young investor populations.
The regression specification is
Yi,t = αi + γi · t+ β1 ·%∆GDPi,t + β2 ·%∆GDPi,t ·Di,t + i,t,
where the relevant parameters follow the above definitions, and β2 is the new coefficient
of interest, with Di,t being one of the indicator variables described above.
In Table 2, columns (1) and (2), we add two interactions of real GDP growth: with
indicators for old investor populations above the median and young investor populations
above the median. In columns (3) and (4), we add two interactions of real GDP growth
with indicators for old investor populations in the top quartile and young investor pop-
ulations in the top quartile.
In all four columns, we estimate a positive coefficient of the interaction between the
indicators for above-median (or top-quartile) old investor populations and GDP growth.
The coefficient is significant at the 1% level in columns (2) and (4) where COD is the
dependent variable. That is, consistent with Proposition 4.1, we find that having a
larger domestic population of older investors predicts increased business-cycle sensitivity.
We note that, although COD and CIF are correlated (Broner et al., 2013, Caballero and
Simsek, 2018, Forbes and Warnock, 2012), it is not surprising that COD (capital outflows
by domestic agents) exhibits a stronger correlation with these interaction variables in light
of our theory, as the analysis focuses on the domestic population.
Our estimates also reveal that, empirically, an increase in the domestic young popula-
tion reduces the sensitivity to business-cycle fluctuations. In columns (1) to (3) of Table
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Table 2: Population and Business Cycle Sensitivity
CIF are the sum of changes in a country’s liabilities from direct investment, portfolio investment,
and other investment from the financial account divided by trend GDP and standardized at the
country level. COD are the sum of changes in a country’s assets from direct investment, portfolio
investment, other investment, and reserve assets from the financial account divided by trend
GDP and standardized at the country level. Real GDP Growth is the percent GDP growth.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CIF COD CIF COD
Real GDP Growth 0.963∗ 1.834∗∗∗ 0.702∗ 1.549∗∗∗
(2.08) (8.20) (1.94) (5.19)
Old Pop. Above Median X GDP growth 0.471 1.916∗∗∗
(0.47) (5.07)
Young Pop. Above Median X GDP growth -0.683 -1.692∗∗∗
(-0.69) (-5.82)
Old Pop. in Top Quartile X GDP growth 1.241 2.046∗∗∗
(1.50) (3.92)
Young Pop. in Top Quartile X GDP growth -0.280 0.491
(-0.45) (1.16)
Country FE X X X X
Country Linear Trend X X X X
Country Clustered SE X X X X
Country Sample G20 G20 G20 G20
R2 0.188 0.267 0.191 0.271
N 710 720 710 720
Number of Countries 19 19 19 19
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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2, the sign on the interaction with the young population is negative and, in column (2),
significant at the 1% level. These results suggest that the effect of being young, implying
a less precise prior, dominates the effect of the stronger domestic prior. As a result,
during a domestic bust the domestic young are more likely to invest abroad which would
reduce the degree of aggregate retrenchment.
Taken together with the results of our model, these results suggests that, in a given
country, the older domestic investors have the most precise prior, the older foreign in-
vestors have the second most precise prior, the domestic young have the next most precise
prior, and the foreign young have the least precise prior.
6 Conclusion
This paper introduces a novel explanation for several classic international macro puzzles
surrounding portfolio investment and capital flows. We introduce a modern macro-finance
approach to belief formation, experience-based learning (EBL), into a two country CARA-
Normal OLG model. In an equilibrium where both countries have the same demographics
but prior beliefs about domestic and foreign output differ, portfolio holdings, prices, and
demand for a country’s risky asset depend on the history of the country’s output. Further,
this model setting generates home bias in portfolio holdings because domestic agents
believe that domestic output is less risky than foreign output. In addition, domestic
agents will overreact to foreign output shocks driving two patterns of behavior, fickleness
and retrenchment. The effect of a negative foreign output shock will negatively affect the
prior of domestics more strongly than their foreign counterparts, which induces them to
be fickle by selling their foreign risky asset. Similarly, in the case of a domestic output
shock foreign agents will value the domestic asset less than the domestic agents, and
this will lead domestic agents to retrench by selling the foreign risky assets to buy the
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domestic risky asset. Our model also generates additional predictions, in particular that
an increase in the domestic old population generates a higher degree of fickleness and
retrenchment. We take this prediction to the data and find supportive evidence.
We view this paper as a first step on bringing to bear insights from experience-based
learning to shed light on empirical regularities in international macro-finance. It could
be extended in several directions. For instance one could consider a subjective model
over the process of output and prices, where agents use past realization of all variables
to update their beliefs.
38
References
Albuquerque, R., G. H. Bauer, and M. Schneider (2009). Global private information in
international equity markets. Journal of Financial Economics 94 (1), 18–46.
Ardalan, K. (2019). Equity Home Bias: A Review Essay. Journal of Economic Sur-
veys 33 (3), 949–967.
Bae, K.-H., R. M. Stulz, and H. Tan (2008). Do local analysts know more? A cross-
country study of the performance of local analysts and foreign analysts. Journal of
Financial Economics 88 (3), 581–606.
Barberis, N., R. Greenwood, L. Jin, and A. Shleifer (2015). X-CAPM: An extrapolative
capital asset pricing model. Journal of Financial Economics 115 (1), 1–24.
Barberis, N., R. Greenwood, L. Jin, and A. Shleifer (2016). Extrapolation and bubbles.
Working Paper, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Berkel, B. (2007). Institutional determinants of international equity portfolios-a country-
level analysis. The BE Journal of Macroeconomics 7 (1).
Bernanke, B. S. (2005). The global saving glut and the US current account deficit.
Working Paper.
Bissiri, P. G., C. C. Holmes, and S. G. Walker (2016). A general framework for updat-
ing belief distributions. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society: Series B (Statistical
Methodology) 78 (5), 1103–1130.
Black, F. (1974). International capital market equilibrium with investment barriers.
Journal of Financial Economics 1 (4), 337–352.
Blanchard, O. (2012). Sustaining a Global Recovery. Finance and Development 46 (3),
9–12.
Botsch, M. and U. Malmendier (2018). Inflation Experiences and Contract Choice –
Evidence from Residential Mortgages. Working paper, UC-Berkeley.
Brealey, R., I. Cooper, E. Kaplanis, et al. (1999). What is the international dimension of
international finance. European Finance Review 3 (1), 103–119.
Brennan, M. J. and H. H. Cao (1997). International portfolio investment flows. The
Journal of Finance 52 (5), 1851–1880.
Brennan, M. J., H. H. Cao, N. Strong, and X. Xu (2005). The dynamics of international
equity market expectations. Journal of Financial Economics 77 (2), 257–288.
Broner, F., T. Didier, A. Erce, and S. L. Schmukler (2013). Gross capital flows: Dynamics
and crises. Journal of Monetary Economics 60 (1), 113–133.
39
Broner, F. A., R. G. Gelos, and C. M. Reinhart (2006). When in peril, retrench: Testing
the portfolio channel of contagion. Journal of International Economics 69 (1), 203–230.
Caballero, R. J., E. Farhi, and P.-O. Gourinchas (2008). An equilibrium model of” global
imbalances” and low interest rates. American economic review 98 (1), 358–93.
Caballero, R. J. and A. Krishnamurthy (2009). Global imbalances and financial fragility.
American Economic Review 99 (2), 584–88.
Caballero, R. J. and A. Simsek (2018). A model of fickle capital flows and retrenchment.
Working Paper, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Campbell, J. Y. and R. J. Shiller (1988). Stock Prices, Earnings, and Expected Dividends.
Journal of Finance 43 (3), 661–676.
Chiang, Y.-M., D. Hirshleifer, Y. Qian, and A. E. Sherman (2011). Do Investors Learn
from Experience? Evidence from Frequent IPO Investors. Review of Financial Stud-
ies 24, 1560–1589.
Chousakos, K., G. Gorton, and G. Ordonez (2016). Aggregate Information Dynamics.
Coeurdacier, N. and P.-O. Gourinchas (2016). When bonds matter: Home bias in goods
and assets. Journal of Monetary Economics 82, 119–137.
Coeurdacier, N., S. Guibaud, and K. Jin (2015). Credit constraints and growth in a
global economy. American Economic Review 105 (9), 2838–81.
Coeurdacier, N., R. Kollmann, and P. Martin (2010). International portfolios, capital
accumulation and foreign assets dynamics. Journal of International Economics 80 (1),
100–112.
Coeurdacier, N. and H. Rey (2013). Home bias in open economy financial macroeco-
nomics. Journal of Economic Literature 51 (1), 63–115.
Collin-Dufresne, P., M. Johannes, and L. A. Lochstoer (2016). Asset pricing when this
time is different. The Review of Financial Studies 30 (2), 505–535.
Cooper, I., P. Sercu, and R. Vanpe´e (2013). The equity home bias puzzle: A survey.
Foundations and Trends in Finance 7 (4), 289–416.
Cooper, I. A. and E. Kaplanis (1986). Costs to crossborder investment and international
equity market equilibrium. Recent developments in corporate finance, 209–240.
Coval, J. D. and T. J. Moskowitz (2001). The geography of investment: Informed trading
and asset prices. Journal of political Economy 109 (4), 811–841.
Dvorˇa´k, T. (2003). Gross capital flows and asymmetric information. Journal of Interna-
tional Money and Finance 22 (6), 835–864.
40
Dziuda, W. and J. Mondria (2012). Asymmetric information, portfolio managers, and
home bias. The Review of Financial Studies 25 (7), 2109–2154.
Errunza, V. and E. Losq (1985). International asset pricing under mild segmentation:
Theory and test. The Journal of Finance 40 (1), 105–124.
Fama, E. F. and K. R. French (1988). Dividend yields and expected stock returns. Journal
of financial economics 22 (1), 3–25.
Fidora, M., M. Fratzscher, and C. Thimann (2007). Home bias in global bond and equity
markets: the role of real exchange rate volatility. Journal of international Money and
Finance 26 (4), 631–655.
Forbes, K. J. and F. E. Warnock (2012). Capital flow waves: Surges, stops, flight, and
retrenchment. Journal of International Economics 88 (2), 235–251.
French, K. R. and J. M. Poterba (1991). Investor Diversification and International Equity
Markets. The American Economic Review 81 (2), 222–226.
Fuster, A., B. Hebert, and D. Laibson (2011). Natural Expectations, Macroeconomic
Dynamics and Asset Pricing. In D. Acemoglu and M. Woodford (Eds.), NBER Macroe-
conomics Annual 2011. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Fuster, A., D. Laibson, and B. Mendel (2010). Natural Expectations and Macroeconomic
Fluctuations. Journal of Economic Perspectives 24, 67–84.
Gehrig, T. (1993). An information based explanation of the domestic bias in international
equity investment. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics , 97–109.
Gourinchas, P.-O. and A. Tornell (2004). Exchange rate puzzles and distorted beliefs.
Journal of International Economics 64 (2), 303–333.
Grinblatt, M. and M. Keloharju (2001). How distance, language, and culture influence
stockholdings and trades. The Journal of Finance 56 (3), 1053–1073.
Guidolin, M. (2005). Home Bias and High Turnover in an Overlapping-generations Model
with Learning. Review of International Economics 13 (4), 725–756.
Hau, H. and H. Rey (2008). Home bias at the fund level. American Economic Re-
view 98 (2), 333–38.
Hertwig, R., G. Barron, E. U. Weber, and I. Erev (2004). Decisions from Experience and
the Effect of Rare Events in Risky Choice. Psychological Science 15, 534 C539.
Hodrick, R. J. and E. C. Prescott (1997). Postwar US business cycles: an empirical
investigation. Journal of Money, credit, and Banking , 1–16.
41
Kaustia, M. and S. Knu¨pfer (2008). Do Investors Overweight Personal Experience? Evi-
dence from IPO Subscriptions. Journal of Finance 63, 2679–2702.
LeRoy, S. F. (2005). Excess Volatility. working paper .
LeRoy, S. F. and R. D. Porter (1981). The present value relation: Tests based on implied
variance bounds. Econometrica 49, 555–574.
Mac´kowiak, B., F. Mateˇjka, and M. Wiederholt (2018). Survey: Rational inattention, a
disciplined behavioral model.
Malloy, C. J. (2005). The geography of equity analysis. The Journal of Finance 60 (2),
719–755.
Malmendier, U. and S. Nagel (2011). Depression Babies: Do Macroeconomic Experiences
Affect Risk-Taking? Quarterly Journal of Economics 126, 373–416.
Malmendier, U. and S. Nagel (2016). Learning from Inflation Experiences. Quarterly
Journal of Economics 131, 53–87.
Malmendier, U., S. Nagel, and Z. Yan (2018). The Making of Hawks and Doves. Working
paper, UC-Berkeley.
Malmendier, U., D. Pouzo, and V. Vanasco (2018). Investor Experiences and Financial
Market Dynamics.
Malmendier, U. and L. S. Shen (2017). Scarred Consumption. Working paper, UC-
Berkeley.
Malmendier, U. and A. Steiny (2018). Rent or Buy? The Role of Lifetime Experiences
of Macroeconomic Shocks within and across Countries. Working paper, UC-Berkeley.
Markowitz, H. M. (1959). Portfolio Selection: Efficient Diversification of Investments,
Wiley, New York, Yale University Press new Haven.
Milesi-Ferretti, G.-M. and C. Tille (2011). The great retrenchment: international capital
flows during the global financial crisis. Economic policy 26 (66), 289–346.
Mishra, A. V. (2015). Measures of equity home bias puzzle. Journal of Empirical Fi-
nance 34, 293–312.
Mondria, J. and T. Wu (2010). The puzzling evolution of the home bias, information
processing and financial openness. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 34 (5),
875–896.
Obstfeld, M. and K. Rogoff (2000). The six major puzzles in international macroeco-
nomics: is there a common cause? NBER macroeconomics annual 15, 339–390.
42
Ravn, M. O. and H. Uhlig (2002). On adjusting the Hodrick-Prescott filter for the
frequency of observations. Review of economics and statistics 84 (2), 371–376.
Schraeder, S. (2015). Information Processing and Non-Bayesian Learning in Financial
Markets. Review of Finance, 1–31.
Shiller, R. J. (1981). Do stock prices move too much to be justified by subsequent changes
in dividends? American Economic Review 71, 421–436.
Simonsohn, U., N. Karlsson, G. Loewenstein, and D. Ariely (2008). The tree of experience
in the forest of information: Overweighing experienced relative to observed information.
Games and Economic Behavior 62 (1), 263–286.
Solnik, B. H. (1974). An equilibrium model of the international capital market. Journal
of economic theory 8 (4), 500–524.
Stulz, R. M. (1981). On the effects of barriers to international investment. The Journal
of Finance 36 (4), 923–934.
Tesar, L. L. and I. M. Werner (1995). Home bias and high turnover. Journal of interna-
tional Money and Finance 14 (4), 467–492.
Tille, C. and E. van Wincoop (2014). International capital flows under dispersed private
information. Journal of International Economics 93 (1), 31–49.
Tversky, A. and D. Kahneman (1974). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and
biases. Science 4157, 1124–1131.
Van Nieuwerburgh, S. and L. Veldkamp (2009). Information immobility and the home
bias puzzle. The Journal of Finance 64 (3), 1187–1215.
Vives, X. (2010). Information and Learning in Markets: The Impact of Market Mi-
crostructure. Princeton University Press.
Weber, E. U., U. Bo¨ckenholt, D. J. Hilton, and B. Wallace (1993). Determinants of
diagnostic hypothesis generation: effects of information, base rates, and experience.
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition 19 (5), 1151.
43
Appendix A Proofs for Results
Remark A.1 (Market Participation). When possible, the proofs are done for a general
demographic structure of market participants. Thus, we introduce the following notation:
φiage is the mass of agents with age ∈ {0, 1}, i. e., young and old, in country i ∈ {H,F}.
See Section 4 for a discussion on what this captures in our OLG setting.
Proof of Proposition 2.1. Let Σ0 = [1/τ
i
i , 0; 0, 1/τ
i
j ] and θ0 = (m
i
i,m
j
j). It follows that,
for any A ⊆ Θ Borel,
µi,nn+age(A) =
∫
A
exp
{−0.5 (∑n+agek=n $(k)(yk − θ)TΣ−1(yk − θ) + (θ − θ0)TΣ−10 (θ − θ0))} dθ∫
Θ
exp
{−0.5 (∑n+agek=n $(k)(yk − θ)TΣ−1(yk − θ) + (θ − θ0)TΣ−10 (θ − θ0))} dθ .
Observe that
n+age∑
k=n
$(k)
{
(yk)
TΣ−1(yk)− 2(yk)TΣ−1θ
}
+ θT
(
Σ−1(age+ 1) + Σ−10
)
θ − 2θT0 Σ−10 θ
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−1
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+ θT
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Letting Ξage = (Σ
−1(age+ 1) + Σ−10 )
−1 and αTn,age ≡
(∑n+age
k=n $(k)(yk)
TΣ−1 + θT0 Σ
−1
0
)
,
it follows that the RHS equals
θTΞ−1ageθ − 2
{
αTn,ageΞage
}
Ξ−1ageθ + α
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n,ageΞageαn,age + stuffn,age
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where stuffn,age ≡ θT0 Σ−10 θ0 +
∑n+age
k=n $(k)(yk)
TΣ−1(yk)− αTn,ageΞageαn,age and does not
depend on θ. Therefore,
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Which implies that µi,nn+age is characterized by a Gaussian pdf with mean α
T
n,ageΞage and
covariance matrix Ξage.
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Observe that Ξage is a diagonal matrix with elements given by
σi,ni,n+age =
σ2
(age+ 1) + τ iiσ
2
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2
.
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Proof of Lemma 3.1. As τ = τ ∗, we have that wage = w∗age and that σ
2
age = σ
∗2
age for
age ∈ {0, 1}. Using the results from the Proof of Proposition 3.1, we have that the
aggregate demand for the asset of country F by agents in country H is
XHF,t = φ
H
0
EH,tt [sF,t+1]
V H,tt [sF,t+1]
+ φH1
EH,t−1t [sF,t+1]
V H,t−1t [sF,t+1]
(24)
where sj,t+1 ≡ yj,t+1 + pj,t+1 − Rpj,t for j ∈ {H,F}. Analogously, the aggregate demand
for the asset of country F by agents in country F is
XFF,t = φ
F
0
EF,tt [sF,t+1]
V F,tt [sF,t+1]
+ φF1
EF,t−1t [sF,t+1]
V F,t−1t [sF,t+1]
(25)
As both countries have the same prior beliefs about output in country F and all agents
in a given cohort observe the same output realizations, it follows that agents in both
countries in a given cohort have the same posterior beliefs.
When both countries have the demographics of market participation, i. e., φHage = φ
F
age
for all age ∈ {0, 1} with φH0 + φH1 = φF0 + φF1 = φ, it follows that XHF,t = XFF,t. Market
clearing implies that
φXHF,t + φX
F
F,t = 1.
It follows that XHF,t = X
F
F,t =
1
2φ
. As in our baseline model we have assumed that each
country has a mass of φ = 1
2
agents, the result follows. The proof for XHH,t = X
F
H,t = 1 is
isomorphic.
Proof of Proposition 3.1. Given their posterior belief, the problem that generation n born
in country i faces at time t is given by (we drop the superscript n, i to reduce notation):
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max
xH,t,xF,t,bt
Et[− exp(−γ · Wt+1)] (26)
s.t. Wt+1 = xH,t (yH,t+1 + pH,t+1 −RpH,t) + xF (yF,t+1 + pF,t+1 −RpF,t) (27)
bt =Wt−1 − xH,tpH,t − xF,tpF,t (28)
Due to the linearity of prices (we focus on Affine Equilibria), we know that Wt+1 is
normally distributed. As a result, the problem can be re-written as follows,
max
xH,t,xF,t
Et [Wt+1]− 1
2
γVt [Wt+1] (29)
s.t. Wt+1 = xH,t (yH,t+1 + pH,t+1 −RpH,t) + xF,t (yF,t+1 + pF,t+1 −RpF,t) (30)
where
Et [Wt+1] = xH,t (Et [yH,t+1 + pH,t+1]−RpH,t) + xF,t (Et [yF,t+1 + pF,t+1]−RpF,t)
Vt [Wt+1] = x2H,tVt [yH,t+1 + pH,t+1] + x2F,tEt [yF,t+1 + pF,t+1]
as outputs are independently distributed across countries. From the FOC of this prob-
lem, we obtain that the demand of generation n ∈ {t, t − 1} in country i ∈ {H,F} for
the asset in country j ∈ {H,F} at time t is:
xn,ij,t =
En,it [yj,t+1 + pj,t+1]−Rpj,t
γV n,it [yj,t+1 + pj,t+1]
.
And the demand for the risk-free asset of cohort n in country i at time t follows from
the budget constraint:
bn,it =Wn,it − xn,iF,tpF,t − xn,iH,tpH,t
Proof of Proposition 3.2. Given our price guess, we use the method of undetermined
coefficients (MUC) and market clearing to obtain prices. We focus on market clearing
for the asset of country i:
φi0
Et,it [yi,t+1 + pi,t+1]−Rpi,t
γV t,it [yi,t+1 + pi,t+1]
+ φi1
Et−1,it [yi,t+1 + pi,t+1]−Rpi,t
γV t−1,it [yi,t+1 + pi,t+1]
+ ... (31)
φj1
Et,jt [yi,t+1 + pi,t+1]−Rpi,t
γV t,jt [yi,t+1 + pi,t+1]
+ φj1
Et−1,jt [yi,t+1 + pi,t+1]−Rpi,t
γV t−1,jt [yi,t+1 + pi,t+1]
= 1 (32)
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Plugging in the price guess, after some algebra we obtain:
φi0
αi + (1 + βi,0)Et,it [yi,t+1] + β∗j,0Et,it [yj,t+1] +∑Kk=1 βi,k · yi,t+1−k +∑Kk=1 β∗j,k · yj,t+1−k
γ
[
(1 + βi,0)
2 σ20 + β
∗
i,0
2σ∗20
]
+ ...
φi1
αi + (1 + βi,0)Et−1,it [yi,t+1] + β∗j,0Et−1,it [yj,t+1] +∑Kk=1 βi,k · yi,t+1−k +∑Kk=1 β∗j,k · yj,t+1−k
γ
[
(1 + βi,0)
2 σ21 + β
∗
i,0
2σ∗21
]
+ ...
φj0
αi + (1 + βi,0)Et,jt [yi,t+1] + β∗j,0Et,jt [yj,t+1] +∑Kk=1 βi,k · yi,t+1−k +∑Kk=1 β∗j,k · yj,t+1−k
γ
[
(1 + βi,0)
2 σ∗20 + β∗i,02σ
2
0
]
+ ...
φj1
αi + (1 + βi,0)Et−1,jt [yi,t+1] + β∗j,0Et−1,jt [yj,t+1] +∑Kk=1 βi,k · yi,t+1−k +∑Kk=1 β∗j,k · yj,t+1−k
γ
[
(1 + βi,0)
2 σ∗21 + β∗i,02σ
2
1
]

= Σ
R
γ
(
αi +
K∑
k=0
βi,k · yi,t−k +
K∑
k=0
β∗j,k · yj,t−k
)
(33)
where
Σ ≡
(
φi0
(1 + βi,0)
2
σ20 + β
∗
i,0
2σ∗20
+
φi1
(1 + βi,0)
2
σ21 + β
∗
i,0
2σ∗21
+
φj0
(1 + βi,0)
2
σ∗20 + β
∗
i,0
2σ20
+
φj1
(1 + βi,0)
2
σ∗21 + β
∗
i,0
2σ21
)
.
We are now ready to use the MUC. We begin by solving for the loadings on the oldest
output realizations (where note that K can be an arbitrary large number):
From yj,t−K , we have that
0 = β∗j,K · yj,t−K ⇐⇒ β∗j,K = 0
and analogously for yi,t−K we have
0 = βi,K · yi,t−K ⇐⇒ βi,K = 0.
From yj,t+1−K , and using the previous results, we have
0 = Σ
R
γ
β∗j,K−1yj,t−(K−1) ⇐⇒ β∗j,K−1 = 0.
Analogously, from yi,t+1−K , we have
0 = Σ
R
γ
βi,K−1yi,t−(K−1) ⇐⇒ βi,K−1 = 0.
Through this process, it is immediate that βi,τ = β
∗
j,τ = 0 for all τ ∈ {t− 2, K]. We
now study the coefficients on the output realizations that also determine beliefs; that is,
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that have been experienced by at least one market participant. We begin by studying
the price loadings on the foreign country output realizations.
From yj,t−1, and using the result that β∗2,k = 0, we have
β∗j,0
(
φi1w
∗
1 (1− ω)
(1 + βi,0)
2
σ21 + β
∗
i,0
2σ∗21
+
φj1w1 (1− ω)
(1 + βi,0)
2
σ∗21 + β
∗
i,0
2σ21
)
= ΣRβ∗j,1.
From yj,t, after some algebra, we have
β∗j,0
(
ΣR− φ
i
0w
∗
1
(1 + βi,0)
2 σ20 + β
∗
i,0
2σ∗20
− φ
i
1w
∗
1 (1− ω)
(1 + βi,0)
2 σ21 + β
∗
i,0
2σ∗21
− φ
j
0w1
(1 + βi,0)
2 σ∗20 + β
∗
i,0
2σ20
− φ
j
0w1 (1− ω)
(1 + βi,0)
2 σ∗21 + β
∗
i,0
2σ21
)
= β∗1,kΣ.
Combining the last two conditions, we obtain:
β∗j,0 = R
(
ΣR− φ
i
0w
∗
1
(1+βi,0)
2
σ20+β
∗
i,0
2σ∗20
− φ
i
1w
∗
1 (1−ω)
(1+βi,0)
2
σ21+β
∗
i,0
2σ∗21
− φ
j
0w1
(1+βi,0)
2
σ∗20 +β
∗
i,0
2σ20
− φ
j
0w1(1−ω)
(1+βi,0)
2
σ∗21 +β
∗
i,0
2σ21
)
(
φi1w
∗
1 (1−ω)
(1+βi,0)
2
σ21+β
∗
i,0
2σ∗21
+
φ
j
1w1(1−ω)
(1+βi,0)
2
σ∗21 +β
∗
i,0
2σ21
) β∗j,0.
which generically holds if and only if
β∗j,0 = 0⇒ β∗j,1 = 0.
Thus, the price of the asset of country i has zero price loadings on output realizations
of country j. Finally, we are left with the most recent output realizations of country i.
From yi,t−1 and using the previous results, we have,
(1 + βi,0) (1− ω)
{
φi1
σ21
w1 +
φj1
σ∗21
w∗1
}
= ΣRβi,1. (34)
From yi,t, we have
(1 + βi,0)
{
φi0
σ20
w0 +
φi1
σ21
w1ω +
φj0
σ∗20
w∗0 +
φj1
σ∗21
w∗1ω
}
+ Σβi1 = ΣRβi,0. (35)
And from the constant terms,
(1 + βi,0)
{
φi0
σ20
(1− w0)mi +
φi1
σ21
(1− w1)mi +
φj0
σ∗20
(1− w∗0)mi +
φj1
σ∗21
(1− w∗1)mi
}
= γ (1 + βi,0)
2 + Σ (R− 1)αi.
(36)
After some simple algebra and imposing that all cohorts in all countries have a mass
of 1
4
, the loadings from the proposition are obtained.
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Proof of Proposition 3.3. To show that a decrease in the prior precision about a for-
eign country induces a home bias in the domestic country, it suffices to show that
∂E[HBt]
∂τ∗ |τ∗=τ < 0, which would imply that HBt > 0 if τ ∗ < τ . As τ ∗ decreases, every-
thing else equal, the aggregate demand in country H of domestic assets, XHH,t, remains
unchanged. Thus, we focus on the effect of a decrease in the prior precision about the for-
eign asset on the demand of the domestic country for the foreign asset. We thus highlight
the terms in the demand that are directly affected by the prior precision τ ∗:
XHF,t = φ
H
0
[
α˜+ (1 + βF,0)(1− w∗0)m
γ(1 + βF,0)2σ∗20
+
w∗0(1 + βF,0) + βF,1 −RβF,0
γ(1 + βF,0)2σ∗20
yF,t − RβF,1
γ(1 + βF,0)2σ∗20
yF,t−1
]
+ ...
φH1
[
α˜+ (1 + βF,0) (1− w∗1)m
γ (1 + βF,0)
2
σ∗21
+
w∗1 (1 + βF,0)ω + βF,1 −RβF,0
γ (1 + βF,0)
2
σ∗21
yF,t +
w∗1 (1 + βF,0) (1− ω)−RβF,1
γ (1 + βF,0)
2
σ∗21
yF,t−1
]
.
where the terms indexed by ∗ are a function of τ ∗. We can then compute ∂X
H
F,t(τ
∗)
∂τ∗ as
follows
= φH0
(yF,t −m) ∂w
∗
0
∂τ∗
γ (1 + βF,0)σ∗20
+φH1
(ωyF,t + (1− ω) yF,t−1 −m) ∂w
∗
1
∂τ∗
γ (1 + βF,0)σ∗21
+φH0
∂xt,HF,t
∂σ∗20
∂σ2∗0
∂τ ∗
+φH1
∂xt−1,HF,t
∂σ∗21
∂σ∗21
∂τ ∗
Thus, if m = E[yF,t] for all t, it follows that
E
[
∂XHF,t (τ
∗)
∂τ ∗
]
= φH0
∂xt,HF,t
∂σ∗20
∂σ2∗0
∂τ ∗
+ φH1
∂xt−1,HF,t
∂σ∗21
∂σ∗21
∂τ ∗
< 0
Thus, everything else equal, as the precision of prior beliefs about the output in the
foreign country decreases, domestic agents demand less of the foreign asset. In equilib-
rium, prices fall to off-set some of this effect, but since the asset supply is fixed, it follows
that in the equilibrium with τ ∗ < τ , and prior beliefs centered around the truth, domestic
agents hold on average a smaller fraction of the foreign asset than of the domestic asset,
E[XHH ] > E[X
H
F ].
Proof of Proposition 3.4. We define flows for country i as the change in the domestic
asset holdings of domestic and foreign investors, respectively:
∆ii,t =
(
X ii,t −X ii,t−1
)
.
∆ji,t =
(
Xji,t −Xji,t−1
)
.
It is immediate that X ii,t−1 and X
j
i,t−1 are independent of yi,t, as they are portfolios
holdings chosen in t − 1. As a result, to understand the change in flows, it suffices to
check that:
∂X ii,t
∂yi,t
< 0
∂Xji,t
∂yi,t
> 0.
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In equilibrium, X ii,t + X
j
i,t = 1, which implies that
∂Xii,t
∂yi,t
= −∂X
j
i,t
∂yi,t
. Thus, it suffices to
show that
∂Xii,t
∂yi,t
< 0.
∂X ii,t
∂yi,t
= φi0
(
w0 (1 + β0,i) + β1,i −Rβ0,i
γ (1 + β0,i)
2 σ20
)
+ φi1
(
w1 (1 + β0,i)ω + β1,i −Rβ0,i
γ (1 + β0,i)
2 σ21
)
by replacing β1,i − Rβ0,i from using equation (35) and using the fact that and using
the fact 1 + β0,i > 0, we obtain
∂Xii,t
∂yi,t
∝
(
φi0
σ20
w0 +
φi1
σ21
w1ω
)
−
(
φi0
σ20
+
φi1
σ21
) (φi0
σ20
w0 +
φi1
σ21
w1ω +
φj0
σ∗20
w∗0 +
φj1
σ∗21
w∗1ω
)
(
φi0
σ20
+
φi1
σ21
+
φj0
σ∗20
+
φj1
σ∗21
) (37)
=
φi0
σ20
φj0
σ∗20
(w0 − w∗0) +
φi0
σ20
φj1
σ∗21
(w0 − w∗1ω) +
φj0
σ∗20
φi1
σ21
(w1ω − w∗0) +
(
φi1
σ21
φj1
σ∗21
)
(w1 − w∗1)ω
Now, when both countries have the same demographics of market participation, φiage =
φ for all i ∈ {H,F} and age ∈ {0, 1}, where φ = 1
4
in the baseline model. With this,
∂Xii,t
∂yi,t
=
φ2
σ20σ
∗2
0
[(
1 +
σ∗20
σ∗21
)
w0 −
(
1 +
σ20
σ21
)
w∗0
]
+
φ2
σ21σ
∗2
1
[(
1 +
σ∗21
σ∗20
)
w1 −
(
1 +
σ21
σ20
)
w∗1
]
ω.
Remember that
σ20 =
[
τ + σ−2
]−1
σ21 =
[
τ + 2σ−2
]−1
σ∗20 =
[
τ ∗ + σ−2
]−1
σ∗21 =
[
τ ∗ + 2σ−2
]−1
w0 =
σ−2
τ + σ−2
w1ω =
σ−2
τ + 2σ−2
w∗0 =
σ−2
τ ∗ + σ−2
w∗1ω =
σ−2
τ ∗ + 2σ−2
Plugging this in, we obtain that the first and second term in brackets are:
(
1 +
σ∗20
σ∗21
)
w0 −
(
1 +
σ20
σ21
)
w∗0 =
2σ−2
(τ + σ−2) (τ ∗ + σ−2)
(τ ∗ − τ) < 0 (38)(
1 +
σ∗21
σ∗20
)
w1ω −
(
1 +
σ21
σ20
)
w∗1ω =
2σ−2
(τ + 2σ−2) (τ ∗ + 2σ−2)
(τ ∗ − τ) < 0 (39)
Thus, it follows that with same demographics,
∂Xii,t
∂yi,t
< 0 and
∂Xji,t
∂yi,t
> 0.
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Proof of Proposition 4.1. To analyze the effect of different demographics, we analyze how
the change in flows varies with changes in the mass of young and old market participants
in both the domestic and the foreign country:
∂
∂φj0
(
∂X ii,t
∂yi,t
)
=
φi0
σ20σ
∗2
0
(w0 − w∗0) +
φi1
σ∗20 σ
2
1
(w1ω − w∗0) (40)
∂
∂φj1
(
∂X ii,t
∂yi,t
)
=
φi0
σ20σ
∗2
1
(w0 − w∗1ω) +
φi1
σ21σ
∗2
1
(w1 − w∗1)ω (41)
∂
∂φi0
(
∂X ii,t
∂yi,t
)
=
φj0
σ20σ
∗2
0
(w0 − w∗0) +
φj1
σ20σ
∗2
1
(w0 − w∗1ω) (42)
∂
∂φi1
(
∂X ii,t
∂yi,t
)
=
φj0
σ∗20 σ
2
1
(w1ω − w∗0) +
φj1
σ21σ
∗2
1
(w1 − w∗1)ω (43)
First, when τ ≥ τ ∗, we have that w0 ≤ w∗0, w1 ≤ w∗1, and w1ω < w∗1ω ≤ w∗0, as foreign
(and young) agents overweight domestic output realizations relative to domestic (and
old) agents. As a result, it is immediate that the sign of (40) and (43) is negative.
Next, we analyze the sign of (41) and (42). Note that for τ = τ ∗, as wage = w∗age for
age ∈ {0, 1}, we have
∂
∂φj1
(
∂X ii,t
∂yi,t
)
=
φi0
σ20σ
2
1
(w0 − w1ω) > 0
∂
∂φi0
(
∂X ii,t
∂yi,t
)
=
φj1
σ20σ
2
1
(w0 − w1ω) > 0
and that for for τ > τ ∗ + σ−2, as w0 = σ
−2
τ+σ−2 <
σ−2
τ∗+2σ−2 = w
∗
1ω, we have
∂
∂φj1
(
∂X ii,t
∂yi,t
)
< 0
∂
∂φi0
(
∂X ii,t
∂yi,t
)
< 0.
Finally, by plugging in the explicit formulas for variances and weights that depend on τ ,
it is straightforward that these sensitivities are monotonically decreasing in τ :
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∂∂φj1
(
∂X ii,t
∂yi,t
)
=
φi0
σ∗21
(
σ−2 − (τ + σ−2)ω1ω)+ φi1
σ∗21
(
σ−2 − (τ + 2σ−2)w∗1ω)
∂
∂φi0
(
∂X ii,t
∂yi,t
)
=
φj0
σ∗20
(
σ−2 − (τ + σ−2)w∗0)+ φj1σ∗21 (σ−2 − (τ + σ−2)w∗1ω)
Thus, it follows that there exists a τ¯1, τ¯2 ∈ (τ ∗, τ ∗ + σ−2) such that ∂∂φj1
(
∂Xii,t
∂yi,t
)
> 0 if
and only if τ < τ¯1 and
∂
∂φi0
(
∂Xii,t
∂yi,t
)
> 0 if and only if τ < τ¯2.
Appendix B Data
This appendix provides a more detailed description of our data and variable construction,
and complements the explanations in the main text.
Our main sources of data are the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) International
Financial Statistics (IFS), including the International Investment Positions (IIP), which is
available from http://data.imf.org/IFS; Balance of Payments (BOP) data, also pro-
vided by the IMF; the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI), available
at https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/world-development-indicators;
and the United Nations’ (UN) data on World Population Prospects (WPP), which we
obtain from https://population.un.org/wpp/Download/Standard/Population/ un-
der Annual Population by Age Groups - Both Sexes. As there is no official crosswalk for
the UN, IMF, and World Bank data, we generate a country crosswalk by hand to merge
the different data sources.
As discussed in the main text, our key variables are yearly measures of Home Bias
in the US, capital outflows by domestic agents (COD), capital inflows by foreign agents
(CIF), and the growth of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP growth), all of which we
defined and discuss in detail below. Table B.1 summarizes the sample sizes and variable
characteristics. All monetary data are in US$ and inflation adjusted using the GDP
deflator.
B.1 Home Bias
The construction of our measure of Home Bias is detailed in the main text, and summa-
rized in the formula
Domestic Equity Investment in the US
Global Equity Investment by the US
− US Market Capitalization
Global Market Capitalization
.
As discussed in Section 5.2, we obtain data on domestic and foreign equity investment
in the US and globally from the IIP data of the IMF, and capitalization data from the
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Table B.1: Summary Statistics
Home Bias based on data from 1980-2017. For COD, CIF, and GDP growth year panel varies
by country.
Variable N Mean SD Min Max
Home Bias 38 0.44 0.09 0.32 0.65
COD 725 0 .99 -3.02 3.31
CIF 714 0 .99 -2.74 4.07
GDP Growth 874 0.05 0.15 -0.64 1.79
World Federation of Exchanges. Here, we provide more details on the location of the
data and the variable construction.
For equity investment, we follow Cooper et al. (2013), Mishra (2015), and Hau and
Rey (2008) and use ‘equity portfolio investment’ as defined by the IMF in their IIP
data and available for 1976-2017. (Note that the start and end years in the IIP data
vary by country, some countries have gaps.) This class of investments captures liquid
investment assets such as listed equities, and also includes investments of less than 10%
in venture capital firms, while investments above 10% in a listed company are excluded
(and counted as direct investment). The restriction to listed equity in our (and in prior)
research reflects that robust data is generally not available for unlisted equities. For each
country and sample year, the IIP provides (1) a country’s assets, which is equal to the
total foreign equity portfolio investment holdings for a country in that year, and (2) a
country’s liabilities, which is equal to the total equity portfolio investment holdings by
foreigners in a country in that year.
We calculate domestic equity investment by the US by subtracting foreign investment
in listed US equity from the US listed-equity market capitalization. Foreign investment
in the US comes from the IIP data within the IFS, specifically “International Investment
Position, Liabilities, Portfolio investment, Equity and investment fund shares [BPM6], US
Dollar (ILPE BP6 USD).” US Market Capitalization comes from the World Federation of
Exchanges, available from the World Bank’s WDI data for 1980-201724, specifically “Mar-
ket capitalization of listed domestic companies (current US$) [CM.MKT.LCAP.CD].” To
calculate total equity investment by the US we sum the US listed-equity investment by
the US and foreign listed-equity investment by the US, also provided directly by the
IIP imder “International Investment Position, Assets, Portfolio investment, Equity and
investment fund shares [BPM6], US Dollar (IAPE BP6 USD).”
For the benchmark measure, the percent of the global portfolio allocated to the US, we
divide the US market capitalization by the global market capitalization, both available
from the World Federation of Exchanges (via the World Bank’s WDI).
24The Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) provides more historical market capitalization
for the US, but not for the world.
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Finally, we note that some of the prior research on home bias, such as Cooper et al.
(2013) and Mishra (2015), use the Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) from
the IMF which provides more granular data than the IIP. However, the CPIS starts only
in 2001, which would halve our sample size. The only potential advantage to using the
CPIS over the IIP data is the ability to estimate “round-tripping,” when money is invested
domestically but through a tax haven so it is counted as a foreign investment in the IIP
data (cf. Cooper et al., 2013). However, the CPIS data only allows for a rather imprecise
estimation of “round-tripping” which could bias results in an unknown direction. By
not accounting for “round-tripping,” our measure is biased towards less domestic US
investment and hence less home bias. As a result, our results are conservative.
B.2 Fickleness and Retrenchment
As indicated in the main text, we calculate our measures of capital flows from annual
changes in assets and liabilities in the IMF’s BOP data, following the variable definitions
of capital inflows by foreign agents (CIF) and capital outflows by domestic agents (COD)
in Caballero and Simsek (2018).
For CIF, we calculate the sum of changes in a country’s liabilities from direct invest-
ment, portfolio investment, and other investment using the BOP data series “Financial
Account, Net Lending (+) / Net Borrowing (−) (Balance from Financial Account), Direct
Investment, Net Incurrence of Liabilities, US Dollars (BFDL BP6 USD),” “Financial Ac-
count, Portfolio Investment, Net Incurrence of Liabilities, US Dollars (BFPL BP6 USD),”
and “Financial Account, Other Investment, Net Incurrence of Liabilities, US Dollars
(BFOL BP6 USD).”
For COD, we calculate the sum of changes in a country’s assets from direct investment,
portfolio investment, other investment, and reserve assets from the financial account using
the BOP data series “Financial Account, Net Lending (+) / Net Borrowing (−) (Bal-
ance from Financial Account), Direct Investment, Net Acquisition of Financial Assets,
US Dollars (BFDA BP6 USD),” “Financial Account, Portfolio Investment, Net Acqui-
sition of Financial Assets, US Dollars (BFPA BP6 USD),” “Financial Account, Other
Investment, Net Acquisition of Financial Assets, US Dollars (BFOA BP6 USD)”, and
“Financial Account, Reserve Assets, US Dollars (BFRA BP6 USD).”
We inflation-adjust, normalize, and standardize the flow variables, as discussed in the
main text. For the inflation adjustment, we use the GDP deflator data available from
the St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank here at https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/
GDPDEF. (We adjust the series to 100 in 2010.) To normalize CIF and COD, we divide by
trend GDP, given by the Hodrick-Prescott filter of Hodrick and Prescott (1997) using the
recommended smoothing parameter of Ravn and Uhlig (2002) of 6.25. After standardizing
the variables to a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1 (at the country level), the
summary statistic of standard deviations in Table B.1 is slightly below 1 due to numerical
error; however, when tabulated, each individual country has a standard deviation of 1
and a mean of 0 up to a high number of digits.
Real GDP growth is calculated from yearly GDP data in contemporaneous US dol-
54
lars provided by the World Bank in the World Development Indicators from 1970-2017
(varying by country), as discussed in the main text. The year of maximum GDP growth,
from 1973 to 1974 in Saudi Arabia, resulted from the rapid increase of oil sales in the
Middle East in the 1970s. The year of minimum GDP growth is from 2001 to 2002 in
Argentina, resulting from the Argentinian debt crisis of the early 2000s. Since these are
not anomalous outliers, but driven by major events, we follow Broner et al. (2013) by
opting not to drop or winsorize any data points.
For the population distribution, we use yearly, country-level population data from the
UN which gives population by country in 5-year age bins estimates from 1950-2020.
We use four country level population-based indicator variables. We follow Malmendier
et al. (2018), in particular the definitions used for calculations using a Markov-Switching
Regime, who define the investor population as those age 25 to 75 and define young as
those below 50. Working within the 5-year age bins provided by the UN, we define
the young investor population of a country as those aged 25 to 49 and the old investor
population as those aged 50 to 74. We calculate all indicators based on countries’ relative
positions within our panel of G20 countries. Since population is a smooth variable and,
relative to other countries, similar across time, we calculate country-level, as opposed
to a country-year-level, indicators. To do this we average each country’s young and old
population from 1970 to 2018. We then determine which countries have above median and
top-quartile levels of average young and old population. Even though size is an important
determinant of whether or not a country has a high level of young/old investors, it is not
the sole determinant and our variables are not collinear.
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